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Ambuj Dewan
This dissertation comprises three essays in behavioral and information economics.
The first, “Estimating Information Cost Functions in Models of Rational Inattention,” uses
laboratory data to analyze the properties of cost functions inmodels of rational inattention
and determine their functional forms. The second, “Promises and Pronouncements,” uses
a laboratory experiment to determine whether the propensity to tell monetarily advan-
tageous lies depends on the ability to control the final outcome; in other words, whether
reneging on a commitment (breaking a promise) is more or less likely than lying about
something out of one’s control (making a false pronouncement). The third, “Costly In-
formation and Multiattribute Choice” provides an information-theoretic explanation for
some commonly observed phenomena in consumer choice when goods are defined by
multiple characteristics.
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Chapter 1
Estimating Information Cost Functions in Models of Rational
Inattention
This chapter is coauthored with Nathaniel Neligh.
1.1 Introduction
It has been observed in many settings that people have a limited capacity for attention,
and this affects the decisions they make. For example, Chetty et al. (2009) demonstrate
that consumers underreact to non-salient sales taxes; De los Santos et al. (2012) show that
people only visit a small number of online retailers before making book purchases; and
Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) provide evidence that people do not fully think about energy
efficiency when making purchasing decisions about light bulbs.¹ Several laboratory ex-
periments demonstrating limited attention have been conducted, including Gabaix et al.
(2006), Caplin and Martin (2013), and Caplin and Dean (2014).
A common explanation for this phenomenon is the theory of rational inattention (Sims,
2003; Sims, 2006; Caplin and Dean, 2015; Matějka and McKay, 2015). This theory posits
that people rationally choose the information to which they attend, trading off the costs
¹For a survey that discusses many more similar field studies, see DellaVigna (2009).
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of paying more attention with the ensuing benefits of better decisions. This decision-
making process occurs in two stages. In the first stage, the decision-maker chooses what
information to acquire and pays costs accordingly. In the second stage, the decision-maker
uses the information she acquired to make decisions.
The first-stage information costs are typically assumed to have some fixed functional
form. Most common is mutual information (cf. Sims, 2003; Matějka and McKay, 2015),
whichmeasures the expected reduction in entropy from a decision-maker’s prior beliefs to
their posterior beliefs. Other cost functions, such as fixed costs for information acquisition
(e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Barlevy and Veronesi, 2000; Hellwig et al., 2012) or
costs for increasing the precision of normally distributed signals (e.g. Verrecchia, 1982;
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010), have also been used. However, little is known
about what form these costs take in reality, and different assumptions on these costs can
lead to starkly different predictions.
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to characterize these information costs,²
a crucial input for models of rational inattention. Subjects complete a series of perceptual
tasks with fine-grained variation in the levels of potential rewards. For each reward level,
we observe both the correct answer and the subject’s response. We interrogate these
data in two ways: (1) testing various properties of cost functions; (2) determining which
models of information costs are consistent with observed behavior.
The cost function properties of greatest interest to us are continuity, convexity, and
perceptual distance, the last of which refers to nearby states being harder to distinguish
from each other than distant ones. The presence or absence of each of these properties
²We also conducted an online experiment, the results of which we report in Appendix C.
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can have profound impacts on the predictions of a model of rational inattention.
Continuity and convexity are important characteristics of many cost functions, such
as the aforementioned mutual-information cost function. The convexity of a cost func-
tion can greatly affect model predictions. For example, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2010) study a portfolio choice problem in which investors choose which assets to learn
about and how much to learn about each of them. Depending on the convexity of the
investor’s utility and cost functions, it can be optimal for the investor to learn about all
available assets or to simply concentrate their attention on a single asset; utility and cost
functions that imply concave objective functions result in generalized learning, whereas
those that imply convex objective functions result in specialized learning. Convexity also
has implications for comparative statics in models of rational inattention. As we prove in
this paper, continuity and a specific form of convexity³ together imply that gross payoffs
(excluding information costs) change continuously in incentives.
Whether or not an information cost function embeds some notion of perceptual dis-
tance can also have an effect on model predictions. Morris and Yang (2016) study a global
game of regime change where players acquire information at a cost. If nearby states of
the world are sufficiently costlier to distinguish from each other as compared to distant
ones, then the game has a unique equilibrium. This result stands in contrast to the result
of Yang (2015), who studies a model where information costs are such that nearby states
are equally as easy to distinguish from each other as distant ones and finds that the game
has multiple equilibria.
In our experiment, we find that roughly one-third of the subjects whose performance
³We call this form of convexity “almost strict convexity.” It is formally defined in Section 1.3.
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on the tasks improves with increasing potential rewards (whom we call “responsive sub-
jects”) have behavior that is consistent with “well-behaved” (i.e. continuous, convex) cost
functions. Roughly 60% of the responsive subjects have behavior consistent with a cost
function that embeds some notion of perceptual distance, in contrast to the mutual infor-
mation cost function, which does not embed such a notion.
The second important set of analyses in our paper fits various classes of cost functions
to our subjects’ data and selects the best fit for each subject. From subjects’ responses for
each reward level, we infer how their performance in the experimental tasks changes with
potential rewards; put differently, we estimate a performance function that traces out the
relationship between the potential reward and the probability of success. Each class of
cost functions implies a specific performance function, and so our model-fitting exercise
involves determining which of these model-implied performance functions most closely
reflects each subject’s performance data.
Of particular interest to us are cost functions with fixed costs for information acquisi-
tion, normal signals with linear precision costs, and the mutual information cost function,
because of their usage in the economic literature. The first implies a binary performance
function with two levels of performance, the second implies a concave performance func-
tion, and the third implies a logistic performance function. Of the set of models we esti-
mate, we find that the data of the subjects who are responsive to incentives are best fit by
one of these three models, with roughly a quarter of subjects best fit by the first model,
one-seventh of subjects best fit by the second model, and two-thirds of subjects best fit by
the third model. Thus, while there is some heterogeneity in the population with respect
to which cost functions best reflect human behavior, the set of potential cost functions
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that we need to consider can be reduced to three cost functions commonly found in the
literature.
Finally, we apply the fixed-cost and mutual-information cost functions to a simple
principal-agent model of investment delegation and find that they imply starkly different
comparative statics results. Fixed costs for information acquisition imply payment struc-
tures that are discontinuous in potential returns, whereas mutual information implies
continuous payment structures.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to use an experiment with fine-grained vari-
ation in incentives to infer properties of information cost functions. This fine-grained
variation is crucial for testing the continuity and convexity of cost functions and for es-
timating subjects’ performance functions, which is crucial for our model-fitting exercise.
Although several papers have examined competing hypotheses of dynamic evidence ac-
cumulation using perceptual data,⁴ ours is the first to run a “horse race” between a large
number of types of cost functions in a static model of rational inattention.⁵
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews various exper-
imental approaches to limited attention in the literature. Section 1.3 presents the theo-
retical framework that we use in this paper. Section 1.4 introduces the type of task that
we implement in our experiment and situates it within our theoretical framework. Sec-
tion 1.5 introduces various models of cost functions and applies them to the tasks of our
experiment. Section 1.6 presents our experimental design and compares it to previous ex-
⁴We discuss some of this literature in the following section.
⁵Cheremukhin et al. (2015) use a “horse race” approach to select between probability weighting func-
tions while assuming a specific but flexible functional form for information costs; their comparison is not
between different information cost functions.
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periments about limited attention. Section 1.7 presents and discusses basic experimental
results and categorizes subjects according to the behaviors they exhibit. Section 1.8 fits
various models of cost functions to the subjects’ data and runs a “horse race” to determine
which is the best fit for each subject. Section 1.9 presents additional results relating to de-
mographics and reaction times. Section 1.10 presents an application of our results to the
delegation of investment. Section 1.11 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to Appendix
A. Additional experimental results are reported in Appendices B and C.
1.2 Related Literature
One approach that has been taken in the experimental literature to examine limited at-
tention has been to give subjects a series of perceptual and/or cognitive tasks and observe
their responses. Several experiments use this technique to test implications and fit pa-
rameters of models of limited attention. Caplin and Dean (2014) use a task involving
the counting of differently-colored balls to test the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a model of rational inattention with discrete choices where information acquisition
is modeled as a static process. Caplin and Dean (2013) use that same task to estimate
subjects’ cost parameters in a mutual information cost function. Shaw and Shaw (1977)
employ a protocol where stimuli are presented at random locations on a tachistoscope.⁶
Using the data they obtained, they estimate how much attention the subjects allocated to
those locations on their visual field. Gabaix et al. (2006) use an experiment involving the
comparison of multiattribute choices to calibrate a model of myopic search.
⁶A tachistoscope is a device used to present visual stimuli for a controlled duration. It has becomemuch
less common in behavioral research since the advent of personal computers.
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This parameter-fitting approach has also been extended outside of the domain of vi-
sual perception to the domain of relative value assessment. Pinkovskiy (2009) and Chere-
mukhin et al. (2015) fit experimental data on choice over gambles to models of limited at-
tention. Krajbich et al. (2010) ask subjects to choose between pairs of snack food items that
the subjects have rated on a numerical preference scale, and using choice and reaction-
time data, they estimate the parameters of a drift-diffusion model (DDM), where informa-
tion acquisition is modeled as a dynamic process.
There is a large literature that uses choice and reaction-time data to compare models
of evidence accumulation. For example, Woodford (2014) presents a model of dynamic
evidence accumulation with mutual-information costs and uses Krajbich et al.’s data to
compare the fit of his optimizing model to the DDM, and Ratcliff and Smith (2004) use
data from several experiments to compare the fits of four different dynamic evidence
accumulation models.
Our experiment synthesizes these approaches. Using choice data from an experiment
with perceptual tasks, we test hypotheses about behavior, including necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for rational inattention, convexity and continuity of cost functions, and
whether subjects are better at distinguishing nearby states from distant ones. We also
estimate parameters of various models of rational inattention and then compare their fits
to each other.
The tasks in our experiment involve the perception of numerosity, a long-standing
area of research in perceptual psychology. Our tasks are similar to those implemented by
Saltzman and Garner (1948) and Kaufman et al. (1949), who present subjects with fields of
randomly arranged dots whose numerosity they have to judge. More recently, the ball-
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counting tasks of Caplin and Dean (2014) have also involved the perception of numerosity.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
Various models of limited attention and imperfect perception have been proposed in the
literature. These models can be classified along two axes: optimizing vs. non-optimizing;
and static vs. dynamic.
In optimizing models, the information acquired by a decision-maker depends on an
explicit choice that is made optimally given their cost and/or constraints. As a result,
any “errors” observed in their decisions can be considered rational. By contrast, in non-
optimizing models, errors in decisions or perception are the result of some exogenous
process that is not chosen by the decision-maker; the choice of information is not explic-
itly modeled or is assumed to be out of the decision-maker’s control.
Models of limited attention and imperfect perception can also be classified accord-
ing to whether they are static or dynamic. In static models, information acquisition is
modeled as a one-time occurrence; either the decision-maker makes a single information-
acqusition choice, or information is modeled as if it is delivered to the decision-maker all
at once. On the other hand, in dynamic models, information is accumulated over time.
That is not to say that static models cannot be applied to situations where information
acquisition is a dynamic process; static models simply restrict their scope to the outcome
of such a process, not the process itself.
We refer to the class of optimizing models as models of rational inattention. In particu-
lar, this paper considers a general static model of rational inattention with finite state and
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action spaces and additively separable costs. Such a model is the focus of Caplin and Dean
(2015) (henceforth CD15), who derive necessary and sufficient conditions for observed be-
havior to be consistent with it. Other papers have considered static rational inattention
models with specific cost functions. For example, Matějka and McKay (2015) derive the
implications of the mutual-information cost function, and Woodford (2012) considers the
prior-independent channel-capacity cost function.
There are also several static, non-optimizing models of limited attention and imper-
fect perception. In consumer choice, one class of papers studies the imperfect perception
of attributes of multi-attribute choices and introduces distortions to those attributes that
depend on the set of available choices (e.g. Bordalo et al., 2013; Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013;
Bushong et al., 2016). These distortions are exogenously imposed; they are not chosen
by the decision-maker. The size and extent of these distortions can be seen as a mea-
sure of the consumer’s inattention. In perceptual psychology, signal detection theory (cf.
Chapter 12 of Frisby and Stone, 2010) provides an important theoretical framework for
studying imperfect perception. In this framework, states of the world are observed with
exogenously given noise, and the decision-maker must determine what the most likely
state was given their observations. We implement a task of this nature in our experiment;
however, we model the noise process as an endogenous choice.
Dynamic models of evidence accumulation have a long tradition in mathematical psy-
chology. In drift-diffusion models (DDMs) (e.g. Ratcliff, 1978; Diederich, 1997), evidence
is modeled as a stochastic process that evolves according to a diffusion process (Smith,
2000), such as Brownian motion. The decision-maker stops gathering evidence and makes
a decision when this process hits some (possibly time-dependent) boundary. This bound-
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ary is often exogenously given, as in Ratcliff (1978), implying a non-optimizing modeling
approach. However, under some conditions, the boundary can be derived as the result
of an optimal stopping problem (e.g. Fudenberg et al., 2015; Tajima et al., 2016). Other
optimizing approaches consider the optimal selection of the intensity of evidence accumu-
lation when the stopping rule is exogenously given (e.g. Woodford, 2014) or the optimal
selection of both evidence accumulation intensity and stopping rule (e.g. Moscarini and
Smith, 2001). The vast majority of these dynamic evidence accumulation models restrict
their focus to situations where the decision-maker must choose between two options,
though Moscarini and Smith extend their model to consider situations with multiple dis-
crete choice alternatives.
In this paper, we adopt a static framework that allows us to consider any finite number
of options for the decision-maker as well as a flexible choice of information-acquisition
technologies.
1.3.1 General Model
In remainder of this section, we present a general framework for analyzing problems of
rational inattention. In this framework, there is an unknown state of the world about
which an decision-maker (DM) can choose to acquire information. This information af-
fects her beliefs about the state of the world. After obtaining this information, she makes
a decision that maximizes her payoff given her beliefs.
We model information as a collection of probabilistic mappings from states of the
world to a set of subjective signals. We define an information structure to be a set of
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conditional distributions of signals given states. Observing a signal generates a corre-
sponding posterior belief over states. Given this posterior belief, the DM maximizes her
payoff by guessing the most likely state. Each information structure has a cost associated
with it.
We remain agnostic about what the exact source of information costs is. Information
costs could represent cognitive or physical effort exerted in learning about the true state,
as well as the opportunity cost of time spent doing so.
This framework has several beneficial features. Firstly, it has the same behavioral
implications as the model of CD15, which means we can apply their necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for models of rational inattention to the problems we study. Secondly,
it expresses information structures as stochastic matrices, which as demonstrated later in
the paper, will permit us to easily compare information structures and to define a simple
geometric notion of convexity of information costs.
Let  = figjji=1 be a finite state space, letM = fmigjM ji=1 be a finite signal space,⁷ and
let A = faigjAji=1 be a finite action space, with jM j  jAj so that there are at least as many
signals as there are actions. Let  = (i)ni=1 2 (), where n := jj, be the DM’s prior
⁷ Given that the state space is finite, the finiteness of the signal space is not a substantive restriction.
In fact, if we assume that more informative information structures are costlier (our Restriction E, presented
later in the paper), it can be shown that given a finite state space, a DM never need use more than a finite
number of signals. This follows from Proposition 4 of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2010). They study a game
where the information structure and the action are chosen by different players, but if we assume those
players’ preferences are perfectly aligned, then ignoring information costs, our frameworkmaps onto theirs.
By their Proposition 4, if a DM employs an information structure with an infinite number of signals, then
ignoring information costs, she could have done at least as well with an information structure with a finite
number of signals. Moreover, since the former information structure is more informative than the latter, it
is costlier. Therefore, the DM will choose to use a finite number of signals.
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whereQ is an information structure (a collection of conditional signal probabilities, given
states), Q is the distribution of posterior beliefs it induces, and hjmi is the posterior
belief associated with signalm.
As explained above, the DM’s problem has two stages. First, she selects an information
structureQ. She then observes a signalm according to that information structure, which
gives her a posterior belief hjmi. Second, given this posterior belief, she chooses an
action a to maximize her expected payoff.
We can express this problem more formally using matrix notation. Let  = diag().⁸
Let U 2 MjAjjj(R) be a matrix with entries ui;j := u(ai; j), i.e. the utility of taking
action i in state j. We refer to U as the payoff matrix.
LetQ be the space of right-stochastic matrices of dimension jj  jM j, and let D be
the space of right-stochastic matrices of dimension jM j  jAj. C : ()  Q  ! R
gives the cost⁹ of selecting an information structure fromQ, given a prior in ().¹⁰
⁸diag(x) is the square matrix that has the entries of x in order on its diagonal and zeroes elsewhere.
⁹ R := R [ f 1;1g is the set of extended reals. If for some ~ and ~Q, C(~; ~Q) = 1, then the cost
of the information structure ~Q given ~ is infinite, and the DM will never select it, provided there is at least
one information structure available at a finite cost.
¹⁰In principle, though the cost-function approach implies flexibility in the selection of information struc-
tures, it can accommodate restrictions on the space of available information structures as well. For example,
if Q^ is the set of admissible structures, then C(;Q) is finite if Q 2 Q^ and infinite otherwise. If a mod-
eler wishes to impose an exogenous process of information acquisition, then he may simply set Q^ to be a
singleton.
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where the entries of Q are qi;j = Pr(mjji), i.e. the probably of signal mj in state i,
and the entries of D are di;j = Pr(ajjmi), i.e. the probability of selecting action aj given
signal mi. We denote the distribution of posteriors (with finite support) that Q induces
by Q 2 (()). The i-th row of Q represents the conditional distribution of signals
given state i, and soQ can be seen as a collection of signal distributions given states. We
refer to D as the decision matrix.
We refer to the maximand in (1.2) as the net payoff and its first component as the
ex-ante gross payoff. Specific realizations of this payoff are called the ex-post gross payoff.
Where it will not cause confusion, we will drop the “ex-ante” and “ex-post.”
This setup allows us to index decision problems of the form of (1.2) by (; U). In this
paper, we will hold  fixed, and thus we will simply index decision problems by U where
it will cause no confusion. If we give a DM a finite set of decision problems fUig, then we
can observe the true state i chosen by nature and action ai chosen by the DM for each
decision problem. Using the data set f(Ui; i; ai)g will allow us to infer the properties of
C(; ). We refer to a data set of this type as stochastic choice data.
¹¹tr(X) denotes the trace of X , the sum of its diagonal entries.
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This version of the DM’s problem allows us to see how the ex-ante gross payoff is con-
structed. For each (i; j),
jM jP
k=1
qi;kdk;j = Pr(ajji) is the probability of taking action j in









, the expected utility in state i, given the subject’s choice of informa-
tion structure and decisionmatrix. Summing these expected utilities andweighting by the














In this setup, for each i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and j 2 f1; : : : ; jAjg, i and uj;i, are exogenous
parameters. For each i 2 f1, : : : ; ng; j 2 f1; : : : ; jAjg, and k 2 f1; : : : ; jM jg, qi;k and
dk;j are chosen by subjects. Though one cannot observe qi;k and dk;j separately, one can
observe the products qi;kdk;j , i.e. if a DM solves the same decision problem repeatedly,
one can observe how often each action is chosen in each state.
1.3.2 Cost Equivalence
As written, the model Subsection 1.3.1 generalizes the model of rational inattention stud-
ied by CD15, assuming a finite set of actions. In contrast to their model, our model allows
for the cost of a distribution of posteriors to depend on the specific signals that generated
each posterior in its support. Put differently, a version of their model with a finite number
of actions is equivalent to ours with the following restriction.
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Restriction A. Cost equivalence. For all priors , C(;Q1) = C(;Q2)wheneverQ1 and
Q2 induce the same distribution of posteriors.
However, as we show below, cost equivalence imposes no additional behavioral re-
strictions, and therefore, any behavior that is consistent with our model is also consistent
with CD15. This result allows us to apply CD15’s necessary and sufficient conditions for
rational inattention to our framework without imposing any restrictions.
Proposition 1. Stochastic choice data are consistent with (1.2) iff they are consistent with
CD15.¹²
To outline the proof, the ‘if’ direction is obvious, since our model generalizes CD15.
To see the ‘only if’ direction, suppose that f(Ui; i; ai)g can be rationalized by (1.2) with
some cost function C(;Q). Define QQ to be set of information structures that induce
the distribution Q over posteriors, and define ~C(;Q) := min
R2QQ
C(;R). It is obvious
that ~C satisfies cost equivalence. Moreover, since a given posterior distribution always
induces the same ex-ante gross payoff, the DM should always choose the lowest-cost way
of inducing that posterior distribution. Thus, the proof boils down to showing that this
minimum is well-defined. Details are in Appendix A.
1.3.3 Testing for Rational Inattention
As CD15 demonstrate, observed behavior is consistent with their model if and only if it
satisfies their “no improving attention cycles” (NIAC) and “no improving action switches”
¹²Though we have a assumed a finite action space in our paper, the proof of Proposition 1 does not rely
on this.
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(NIAS) conditions.¹³ Their NIAC condition ensures that improvements to gross payoffs
cannot be made by reallocating attention cyclically across decision problems, and their
NIAS condition ensures that the DM’s actions are optimal given the beliefs induced by
her chosen information structure. Because our model is behaviorally equivalent to theirs,
NIAC andNIAS are necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic choice data to satisfy
our model. Put differently, the DM fails to fulfill either of those two conditions if and only
if there does not exist a cost function that rationalizes her stochastic choice data.
In our notation, the NIAC condition can be expressed as follows. Assume a fixed
prior , and let U0; U1; : : : ; UJ 1 be any set of two or more payoff matrices. Let
Q0; Q`; : : : ; QJ 1 andD0; D1; : : : ; DJ 1 be the corresponding information structures and
decision matrices selected by the DM, and let Dji be a decision matrix that maximizes














The NIAS condition can be expressed as follows. Assume a fixed prior . Then for any
payoffmatrixU , letQ be the information structure andD be the decision matrix chosen
by the DM.Then the NIAS condition states that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; jAjg such that the k-th
¹³The NIAS condition is due to Caplin and Martin (2015). It is the key condition that characterizes their
Bayesian expected utility model.
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column of D (denoted by d;k) has at least one nonzero entry and any l 2 f1; : : : ; jAjg:
uk;Qd;k  ul;Qd;k (1.5)
where uk; and ul; are the k-th and l-th rows of U , respectively.
Proposition 2. NIAC and NIAS are necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic choice
data to satisfy (1.2).
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 1 of the present paper and Theorem 1 of
CD15.
1.3.4 Responsiveness
A set of behaviors that is consistent with rational inattention is one where the DM’s be-
havior does not change across decision problems; regardless of the decision problem, she
chooses the same information structure and decision matrix. This is consistent with mod-
els such as signal detection theory, where the DM’s information structure is exogenously
given. In those cases, the DM simply does not respond to changes in incentives across
decision problems. More interesting are cases where the DM does modify her behavior
in response to changes in incentives.
Definition 1. Suppose that a DM is given a set of decision problemsU = fU1; U2; : : : UJg.
Further suppose that 9U; ~U 2 U satisfying the following: for each i 2 f1; : : : ng, let
i 2 argmax
j2f1;:::;jAjg
ui;j ; 8 i 2 f1; : : : ng, ~ui;j  ui;j if j = i and ~ui;j  ui;j if j 6= i,
with at least one strict inequality. Then we say the DM is responsive (to incentives)
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Put differently, a DM is responsive to incentives if for some pair of decision problems,
her probability of taking a (gross) payoff-maximizing action increases when the utility
associated with payoff-maximizing actions increases and the utility associated with non-
payoff-maximizing actions decreases.
Responsiveness is a fairly intuitive condition for human behavior to fulfill. Roughly
speaking, it says that people perform better (by choosing the best option more often)
when the stakes are higher.
1.3.5 Continuity and Convexity
In this subsection, we establish sufficient conditions for continuous gross payoffs in gen-
eral rational inattention problems. Roughly speaking, continuity and convexity of the
information cost function imply gross payoffs that are continuous in incentives.
Restriction B. Continuity. C(;Q) is continuous in its second argument.¹⁴
Continuity is a typical assumption in much of economic analysis. In this case, it im-
plies that gathering a small amount of additional information increases the total cost of
information by only a small amount. This may seem like a fairly innocuous assumption,
but it precludes some plausible cost functions, such as those with fixed costs for informa-
tion acquisition, as will be seen in Section 1.5.
¹⁴Because R is not metrizable with the standard Euclidean topology, we are implicitly assuming here
that C maps to R, i.e. it is nowhere infinite.
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Restriction C. Convexity. 8 2 ();8 2 (0; 1); 8Q1; Q2 2 Q, C(; Q1 + (1  
)Q2)  C(;Q1) + (1  )C(;Q2).
Restriction D. Almost strict convexity. 8  2 ();8 2 (0; 1);8Q1; Q2 2 Q,
C(; Q1 + (1   )Q2)  C(;Q1) + (1   )C(;Q2), where the inequality is strict
except possibly if Q1 and Q2 induce the same distribution of posteriors.
These notions of convexity can be contrasted with CD15’s. CD15 define a notion of
convexity over the space of distribution of posteriors called “mixture feasibility”;¹⁵ how-
ever it is not testable. In our framework, cost functions are defined over stochastic ma-
trices instead of the distributions of posteriors they induce. Since the space of stochastic
matrices can be identified with a subset of Euclidean space, Restrictions C and D give
us easily interpretable “geometric” notions of convexity. Moreover, Restriction D has
testable implications.
It is clear that Restriction D is a special case of Restriction C. Restriction D is also
a slight relaxation of strict convexity. We employ this slight relaxation because strict
convexity would be incompatible with Restriction A, cost equivalence. To see why,







Q3 = 0:5Q1 + 0:5Q2 =
0BB@ 0:5 0:5
0:5 0:5
1CCA. In all three of these information structures, a
given signal is induced by each state with the same probability. Therefore, the distribu-
tion of posteriors each one generates is the degenerate distribution on the prior, and by
¹⁵Restriction C involves mixtures of conditional signal probabilities, which could yield posteriors not
generated by either information structure in the mixture, whereas mixture feasibility involves mixtures of
distributions of posteriors whose support is the union of the supports of the distributions in the mixture.
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cost equivalence, all three information structures should have the same cost. However,
Q3 is a convex combination ofQ1 andQ2, and so if the cost function were strictly convex
it would have to have a strictly lower cost thanQ1 orQ2. Thus, Restriction A is incompat-
ible with strict convexity. However, under almost strict convexity,Q3 would be permitted
to have the same cost as Q1 and Q2.
In order to ensure that continuity and almost strict convexity imply continuous gross
payoffs, we require two additional conditions.
Restriction E. Monotonicity of information. Let R be a right-stochastic matrix of di-
mension jM j  jM j, which we refer to as a garbling matrix. Then for any  2 () and
Q 2 Q, C(;Q)  C(;QR).
Restriction E is equivalent to Condition K1 of CD15. If Q is an information structure
and R is a garbling matrix, then Q can be thought of as containing all the information
contained in QR, i.e. QR simply adds noise to Q. In this case, we shall say that Q
Blackwell-dominates QR. As shown by Blackwell (1953),Q yields a (weakly) higher gross
payoff thanQR for any decision problem, given an optimal selection of decision matrices.
Therefore, Restriction E implies that if one information structure is more informative than
another, then it is also costlier. This restriction does not provide a complete order on
information costs, since it is possible that two experiments are not ranked in the Blackwell
sense. In other words, if Q1 and Q2 are information structures of the same dimension,
there does not necessarily exist R of appropriate dimension such that Q1R = Q2 or
Q2R = Q1.
CD15 show that this restriction is not testable; any stochastic choice data set that is
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consistent with some cost function C is also consistent with some cost function ~C that
satisfies Restriction E. Therefore, requiring it does not eliminate any additional sets of
stochastic choice data from being consistent with a model of rational inattention.
Restriction F. Cost symmetry. Let R be a jM jjM j permutation matrix. Then 8Q 2
Q; C(;Q) = C(;QR).
It is easy to see that cost equivalence (Restriction A) implies cost symmetry. This
restriction says that the cost of an information structure is invariant to the labeling of its
signals; only the conditional probabilities of generating each signal matter.
We have now established a set of sufficient conditions that ensure that the DM’s ex-
ante gross payoff is continuous in incentives.
Proposition 3. Suppose that  is fixed and C satisfies Restrictions B, D, E, and F. Then the
ex-ante gross payoff is continuous in U .
Monotonicity of information and cost symmetry ensure that the decision matrix cho-
sen by the DM can be fixed, which in turn ensures the convexity of the problem. While
almost strict convexity does not ensure a unique solution to the problem, it does ensure
that the optimal ex-ante gross payoff is single-valued, which together with the continuity
of the cost function implies the result.
At this point, a clarification is in order. Proposition 3 is a statement about what the
properties of an information cost function imply about behavior. To obtain a statement
about what behavior implies about the properties of cost functions, we invoke the con-
trapositive: if gross payoffs are discontinuous in incentives, then this behavior cannot
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be rationalized by an information cost function that satisfies Restrictions B, D, E, and F
simultaneously. However, as we explained earlier in this subsection, Restrition E is not
testable, and furthermore, since Restriction F is implied by the untestable cost-equivalence
Restriction A, it is also untestable. Therefore, given stochastic choice data, we can assume
the cost function that rationalizes it satisfies Restrictions E and F, and so if we observe that
ex-ante gross payoffs are discontinuous in incentives,¹⁶ then this implies that the DM’s
cost function either is discontinuous or fails almost strict convexity.
The restrictions necessary for 3 are satisfied by many different cost functions. In par-
ticular, cost functions that can be expressed as a sum of convex functions of the entries
of a stochastic matrix are almost strictly convex.
Proposition 4. Let fci;j(; )g, i 2 f1; : : : ; ng; j 2 f1; : : : ; jM jg be a collection of continu-
ous functions on ()  [0; 1] such that for fixed , each ci;j(; ) is a twice continuously
differentiable function with R with @2ci;j(;)
@q2
> 0 8 q 2 (0; 1);8 i 2 f1; : : : ; ng; 8 j 2
f1; : : : ; jM jg. Then C(;Q) :=Pi;j ci;j(; qi;j) satisfies Restrictions B through D.
1.4 Uniform Guess Tasks
Consider a task where there is some unknown true state of the world that a decision-
maker (DM) has to identify, and learning about the true state is costly. There are n possible
states, each of which is a priori equally likely. The DM receives a reward r for correctly
identifying the state and no reward for incorrectly identifying the state. Therefore, the
¹⁶The reader may have noticed that strictly speaking, observing a discontinuity is technically impossible
without an infinite data set. We expound upon this point in the following section. For now, simply assume
that the data strongly suggest that gross payoffs are discontinuous in incentives.
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DM’s goal is to maximize her probability of correctly identifying the state, net of whatever
costs she incurs in gathering information about the true state. We refer to tasks with this
setup as uniform guess tasks.
An example of such a task is the type of task we implement in our experiment. In this
type of task, which we refer to as the “dots” task, the DM is shown a screen with a random
arrangement of dots. Her goal is to determine the number of dots on the screen, which
is between 38 and 42, inclusive, with each possible number equally likely. She receives a
reward r for correctly guessing the number of dots and no reward otherwise.
In our example, information costs could include the cost of effort exerted in counting
dots, cognitive costs incurred in employing an estimation heuristic, or the opportunity
cost of time spent trying to determine the number of dots.






Pr(a = xj = x)  C(unif; Q) (1.6)
where  is a state of the world, a is the subject’s guess of the state, and C(unif; Q) is the
cost associated with information structure Q and the uniform prior. Put differently, the
DM rationally chooses an information structure to maximize her net payoff (1.6). Thus,
uniform guess tasks can be considered problems of rational inattention. The cost function
C(unif; Q) is the primary object of interest in our experiment.
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1.4.1 Applying the General Model and Performance Functions
The general model we presented in Section 1.3 can be applied to uniform guess tasks.
In these decision problems, since the DM is trying to determine the true state, we can
set A = . Moreover, U = rIn for some r > 0. Therefore, the DM’s ex-ante gross
payoff in this task can be written as rtr(QD). Note that P := tr(QD) = 1
n
tr(QD) is
the ex-ante probability of correctly guessing the state, which we call their performance.
For each reward r, the DM’s optimal choice of Q and D induce an optimal performance
P (r), which we call the performance function. We can estimate P (r) from stochastic
choice data, and by studying its properties, we can infer the properties of the DM’s cost
function.
Given some choice ofQ, the DM should optimally chooseD so that given a signal, she
chooses the most likely state; put differently, she should choose the matrixD that selects










In uniform guess tasks, NIAC can be tested by looking at the performance function P (r).
Proposition 5. In a set of uniform guess tasks, the DM’s behavior is consistent with NIAC iff
P (r) is nondecreasing.
In other words, the DM’s behavior is consistent with NIAC if and only if she performs
no worse when given higher incentives; she allocates her attention such that she pays
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more attention to more valuable tasks.
For testing NIAS in uniform guess tasks, we require a more detailed summary of the
data than the performance function; simply looking at which questions were answered
correctly or incorrectly is insufficient.
Proposition 6. In a set of uniform guess tasks, the DM’s behavior is consistent with NIAS iff
8 x 2 A; 8 y 2 ;Pr( = xja = x)  Pr( = yja = x).
In other words, the DM’s behavior is consistent with NIAS if and only if the mode of
each posterior distribution of states given an action is equal to that action; if an outside
observer were to see the DM’s actions without observing the true states, then his best
guess of the true state for any task would be the answer given by the DM.
1.4.3 Responsiveness
In a set of uniform guess tasks, any pair of tasks with different reward levels satisfies
the conditions required for the definition of responsiveness. This is easy to see: the util-
ities associated with payoff-maximizing actions are constant within each corresponding
payoff matrix and higher in one payoff matrix than the other. Furthermore, the utilities
associated with non-payoff-maximizing actions are all zero. Therefore, responsiveness in
uniform guess tasks boils down to there being at least one pair of reward levels such that
the DM performs strictly better at the higher reward level than at the lower one.
Thus, responsiveness implies that the performance function cannot be flat every-
where. In other words, it must have a region of strict increase.
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1.4.4 Continuity and Convexity
In uniform guess tasks, Proposition 3 has a simple implication for behavior: if the condi-
tions of the proposition are satisified, then performance is continuous in reward.
Proposition 7. If C satisfies Restrictions B, D, E, and F, then P (r) is continuous.
Proof. Since optimal gross payoffs are given by rP (r), this follows immediately from
Proposition 3.
Using the same contrapositive reasoning as we did in Subsection 1.3.5, this means that
if we observe a discontinuous performance function, then the DM’s cost function either
is discontinuous or violates almost strict convexity.
1.4.5 Perceptual Distance
In uniform guess tasks, where the action space is identified with the state space, we can
establish a meaningful concept of perceptual distance. Perceptual distance refers to the
notion that distant states are easier to distinguish from each other than nearby ones. For
example, if = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, and the true state is  = 2, then the DMmay be more likely
to answer 1 (which is 1 away from 2) than she is to answer 5 (which is 3 away from 2).
This is especially plausible if the states in represent physical, measurable quantities. To
give a more concrete example, when shopping for televisions, one is much more likely to
misperceive a 27-inch screen as a 23-inch screen than as a 40-inch screen. We formalize
this notion below.
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Definition 2. Let  be a metric on . Then in this task, the DM evinces the perception of
distance iff 8 x; y; z 2 ; (x; y) > (x; z) =) Pr(a = yj = x) < Pr(a = zj = x).
In other words, the DM evinces the perception of distance if for each possible true
state, she is more likely to give an answer close to the true state than one farther away
from it.
Though one can define a metric on a given set in many different ways, it makes sense
to take  to be a “natural” metric on . For instance, if  is a subset of the real line as
in the example above, then absolute value, (x; y) = jx  yj, may be a sensible metric to
use. Since the state space in our experiment is such a subset, absolute value is the metric
we use in analyzing our experimental results.
1.5 Cost Functions
The space of admissible cost functions is vast. Indeed, any cost function C : () 
Q  ! R leads to behavior consistent with NIAS and NIAC. In this subsection, we intro-
duce the classes of cost functions that are most relevant for our analysis and derive their
behavioral implications.
1.5.1 Mutual Information
Mutual information is one of the most common information cost functions in the eco-
nomic literature, having been used since at least Sims (2003). Mutual information is de-
fined as the expected reduction in entropy from the prior to the posterior. If we denote
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the mutual information cost function by I and entropy by H , then:















where  > 0 and we adopt the convention that 0 ln 0 = 0 and 0 ln 0
0
= 0.
Mutual information satisfies some of the restrictions of Section 1.3.
Proposition 8. Mutual information satisfies Restrictions A, C, E, and F.
In uniform guess tasks, we can derive closed-form expressions for the DM’s optimal
behavior.
Proposition 9. Suppose that i = 1n 8i 2 f1; : : : ; ng so that the prior is uniform on  and
that C(;Q) = I(;Q) := (H(p) E[H(jQ)]),  > 0, i.e. C is the mutual information
cost function. Then, the probability of guessing the correct state is continuous in the reward.




, and the probability of guessing
any given incorrect state is 1
n 1+exp( r)
.
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 1 of Matějka and McKay (2015).
Note that mutual information is convex, but it can be shown that it is not almost
strictly convex, i.e. it does not satisfy Restriction D.¹⁷ Therefore, Proposition 9 cannot be




































































1CCA. These two in-
formation structures induce different distributions of posteriors (albeit with the same support). However,
it can be shown that any convex combination Q := Q1 + (1   )Q2;  2 [0; 1] of them is such that
I(;Q) = I(;Q1 + (1  )I(;Q2), thereby violating almost strict convexity.
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derived as a special case of Proposition 3.
There are two important things to note about Proposition 9. The first is that mutual
information implies a logistic performance function, which is defined by a single param-
eter . The second is that for any given true state , the probability of answering each
incorrect state is equally likely, i.e. a DM with a mutual information cost function does
not evince the perception of distance.
1.5.2 Fixed Costs
Another common model of information costs in the literature is “all-or-nothing” costs,
where the DM begins with no information but can become completely informed about
the state of the world if she pays a cost (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig et al.,
2012). Here, we generalize this form of costs by allowing for the DM to receive some
information for free and pay a fixed cost to receive more information; we do not stipulate
that she must become fully informed.
We can represent this situation as follows. Let there exist Q; Q such that Q = QR




0; Q = Q
; Q = Q
1; otherwise
(1.9)
According to this cost function, the DM can receive the information contained in Q for
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Figure 1.1: Fixed cost for information acquisition.
The left panel shows the cost function, and the right panel shows the resulting perfor-
mance curve. Parameters are  = 30, q = 0:3, and q = 0:8.
free, but she must pay a fixed cost  to acquire the information in Q.
Cost functions with fixed costs such as these can be seen as representing dual-system
cognitive processes (cf. Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003). In such processes, a
small amount of information may be acquired at a very low cost, but there is a fixed cost
to acquiring more information. This implies a discontinuity in the cost function between
information structureswith “low” informativeness and thosewith “high” informativeness.
In uniform guess tasks, each of the two admissible information structures Q and Q
induces a corresponding performance level q and q, respectively, the former of which
is achievable for free and the latter of which costs . She is incapable of achieving a
higher performance than q. Therefore, the DMwill pay the cost  of acquiring information
only when rq     rq. This implies a binary performance function: for r  
q q , the
DM acquires no information and achieves q, and for r > 
q q , the DM acquires enough
information to achieve q.
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Cost functions of this subclass are easily recoverable from data by estimating the rela-
tionship depicted in the right panel of Figure 1.1 and finding the incentive level threshold
at which the DM’s performance level jumps.¹⁸
1.5.3 Normal Signals
Some authors, such as Verrecchia (1982) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010),
have assumed that the DM receives normally distributed signals about the underlying
state of the world, and she pays a higher cost for a more precise signal. In this subsection,
we present such a situation. We then present a discretized version of it that is compatible
with our model and generates the same predictions.
Let   R, so that we can order its elements from smallest to largest as 1 < 2 <
: : : < n,¹⁹ and suppose that the DM receives signals m^  N(; 2) about the state of the
world . The DM can choose the precision 2 :=  2 of these signals, and she pays a cost
K() accordingly, where K is increasing, convex, and differentiable.²⁰
Now suppose that the DM has been given a uniform guess task and has received a





























where () is the standard normal density. Notice that the denominator in (1.10) depends
¹⁸Technically speaking, what we recover is the performance levels q and q, not the specificQ and Q that
induced them.
¹⁹Recall that  is finite, so it has a minimal element 1 and a maximal element n.
²⁰Note thatK is defined as a function of the positive square root of the precision. However, for the sake
of parsimony, we will refer to it as the “cost of precision.”
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only on m^; it is the same for all . Therefore, if the DM is trying to determine the most
likely state given her signal, she only needs to compare the numerators of (1.10) for each
possible ; in other words, she only needs to find the state that maximizes the conditional
probability density of her signal.
Since the normal probability density function is symmetric around its mean, the con-
ditional probability density of her signal is maximized at 1 if m^  12(1 + 2), at i if
m^ 2 1
2
(i 1 + i); 12(i + i+1)
 for i 2 f2; 3; : : : ; n  1g, and at n if m^  12(n 1 + n).
This implies that if the DM guesses optimally given her signal, then her probabilities
of guessing state i given true state j are:













(i 1 + i); 12(i + i+1)






 = j ; i = n
(1.11)
Since signals are normally distributed, the probabilities in (1.11) can be rewritten as:
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(i + i 1)  j








(n 1 + n)  j

; i = n
(1.12)
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
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If the distance between consecutive states is constant so that 9  such that i  i 1 = 2





[2 () + (n  2) (2 ()  1)] K() (1.14)
This assumption of equidistant states allows us to draw some conclusions about
whether a DMwho receives normal signals necessarily evinces the perception of distance.
The answer, in general, is no. This is because the lowest possible state 1 is guessed for
any signal m^  1
2
(1+2).²¹ If the costs of precision are very high, so that the DM selects
a very low signal precision, then her distribution of signals may have fat enough tails
that for some true state, guessing the lowest state is likelier than guessing the next outer-
most state, i.e. Pr  m^  1
2
(1 + 2)
 = j > Pr  m^ 2 12(1 + 2); 12(2 + 3) = j
for some j  2.
However, while we cannot conclude that a DMwith normal signals necessarily evinces
the perception of distance over the entire state space, we can say that she does if we restrict
our focus to guesses of inner states (i.e. states 2 to n 1).
Proposition 10. In a uniform guess task with equidistant states, a DM with normal signals
²¹A symmetric argument applies to the highest possible state.
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Figure 1.2: Normal signals with cost of precision given by K() = 42.
The left panel shows the cost function, and the right panel shows the resulting perfor-
mance curve.
evinces the perception of distance for guesses of inner states; that is to say, 8x 2 ; y; z 2
 n f1; ng; jx  yj> jx  zj=) Pr(a = yj = x) < Pr(a = zj = x).
The assumption of equidistant states also allows us to determine the shape of the
performance function.
Proposition 11. A DM with normal signals and a convex, increasing cost of precision K()
with non-negative third derivative²² has a strictly concave performance function.
This type of performance function is depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 1.2.
Thus far in this subsection, we have implicitly assumed an uncountable signal space.
However, the model of Section 1.3 assumes a finite signal space. We can reduce this setup
to one with a finite signal space by assuming a set of signals fm1;m2; : : : ;mng that are
²²This assumption on the third derivative is a technical assumption. It holds if, for instance,K is linear
in precision (i.e. quadratic in the square root of precision), as we assume later in the paper.
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generated with the probabilities given in (1.12). In other words, the information structure
Q is such that:









(1 + 2)  j








(i+1 + i)  j
      1
2
(i + i 1)  j








(n 1 + n)  j

; i = n
(1.15)
The cost associated with information structures in this setup is then C(;Q) = K()
if Q has the form of (1.15) and1 otherwise.
1.5.4 Performance-Dependent Cost Functions
As we showed in Subsection 1.4.1, in uniform guess tasks the DM’s ex-ante gross payoff is
given by rtr(QD). Therefore, their gross payoff depends directly on their performance
tr(QD). It is possible that the DM selects a desired performance level and pays a cost
that depends only on this performance level.















is the DM’s performance. Moreover, if K is continuously differentiable and strictly convex
with K 0   1
n

< r < K 0(1), then q solves r = K 0(q), and qi;j = 0 8 j > n, and moreover,
q = P (r) is continuous.
If Q is chosen as in Proposition 12, then the optimal decision matrix D is such that
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Figure 1.3: Quadratic costs.
The left panel shows the cost function, and the right panel shows the resulting perfor-
mance curve.
its first jAj rows form the identity matrix. This ensures that q is the subject’s performance.
Then, the cost function can be written as a function of q, i.e. K(q). It is for this reason
that we consider the class of cost functions described in Proposition 12 to be performance-
dependent.
A subclass of cost functions that is easily recoverable from data includes the cost func-
tions from the second part of Proposition 12, i.e. continuously differentiable and strictly
convex K . In that case, as the proposition states, r = K 0(q). Therefore, the performance
function is P (r) = (K 0) 1(r), and the cost function can be recovered by inverting and
integrating the performance function. For example, if the performance function is affine,
then its inverse is also affine, and the inverse’s integral is quadratic; i.e. the cost function
is quadratic in performance.
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Table 1.1: Properties of cost functions
Cost Function Continuity Convexity Perceptual Distance Performance Function
Mutual information Yes (Weakly) convex No Logistic
Fixed costs No No Can accommodate Binary
Normal signals In precision In precision On inner states Concave
Strictly convex in performance Yes Strictly in performance Can accommodate Inverse of derivative
Note: Perceptual-distance and performance-function properties of normal-signal costs are for state spaces with equidistant spacing.
1.5.5 Summary
Table 1.1 summarizes the properties of the cost functions discussed in this section. It
should be noted that each of these cost functions implies a different performance function
in uniform guess tasks. Therefore, which of these cost functions best reflects the DM’s
behavior can be determined by seeing which of the corresponding performance functions
is closest to the DM’s observed performance function.
1.6 Experimental Design
The experiment we implemented involved a series of perceptual tasks, each for a potential
reward. In each of these tasks, subjects were shown a screen with a random arrangement
of dots and were asked to determine the number of dots on the screen. The number of
dots was between 38 and 42, inclusive, and each number was equally likely. Subjects were
informed of these facts; there was no deception or withholding of information about the
structure of the tasks. Subjects also completed tasks involving the identification of angles.
We refer to the first type of task as the “dots” task and to the second as the “angle” task.
Subjects generally did not exhibit responsiveness in the “angle” tasks, and so we relegate
their description and results to Appendix B.
Each task had a potential reward in a currency called “points.” At the start of each
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Figure 1.4: Incentive display for a task
task, subjects were shown this reward, which we refer to as the incentive level, in large
characters for three seconds (e.g. Figure 1.4), before it was replaced with the random dot
arrangement (e.g. Figure 1.5). (The incentive level continued to be displayed to the right of
the arrangement.) Subjects then had as much time as they desired to determine the num-
ber of dots on the screen before proceeding to the next task. If they answered correctly,
then they earned the potential reward; if not, then they earned no points for that task.
Feedback was not given until the end of the experiment. After completing the tasks (but
before receiving feedback) subjects completed a brief demographic questionnaire asking
about age, gender, and education. The questionnaire also asked subjects about the strate-
gies they used for determining the number of dots on each screen, as well as whether they
varied their strategies depending on the level of reward.
Subjects completed 200 tasks, each at an integer incentive level between 1 and 100,
inclusive. Blocks of tasks were balanced by incentive level to ensure roughly the same
level of variation in incentive throughout the experiment. Subjects were first shown each
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Figure 1.5: Arrangement of dots for a task
of the 50 odd incentive levels between 1 and 100 in a random order, and were then shown
each of the 50 even incentive levels between 1 and 100 in a random order. This was
repeated (in a different random order) for the next 100 tasks.
Experimental earnings were determined as follows. One task from the first half the
experiment and one task from the second half of the experiment were randomly selected
for payment. The incentive level of each selected task determined the probability of win-
ning one of two monetary prizes. For example, if the first selected task had an incentive
level of 84 and was answered correctly, and the second selected task had an incentive level
of 33 and was answered incorrectly, then this would give the subject an 84% probability
of winning the first prize and a 0% probability of winning the second prize. Determining
earnings in this manner ensured that expected earnings were linear in the incentive level,
which obviated the need to elicit risk preferences. In other words, this ensured that un-
der the assumption of expected utility theory, the subjects’ utilities (ignoring information
costs) were known to us (up to a multiplicative constant). Thus, the estimated relation-
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ship between performance and incentive level for each subject could be considered a valid
estimate of their performance function, without the need to apply any additional trans-
formation.
As mentioned above, subjects completed 200 tasks in total: 100 “dots” tasks and 100
“angle” tasks. They either completed all the “dots” tasks or all the “angle” tasks first, and
this order was randomly determined. For 41 subjects, the prizes were $10 US, and for 40
subjects, the prizes were $20 US. In addition, subjects were paid a $10 participation fee.
All sessions were conducted at the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social
Sciences (CELSS) at Columbia University, using theQualtrics platform. We ran 8 sessions
with a total of 81 subjects, who were recruited via the Online Recruitment System for
Economics Experiments (ORSEE) (Greiner, 2015).
1.7 Basic Results and Categorization
In this section, we present the main results of our laboratory experiments. First, we con-
sider choice data in the aggregate. Thenwe perform an individual-level analysis to classify
subjects according to whether they are rationally inattentive, are responsive to incentives,
have violations of convexity and/or continuity in their cost functions, and evince the per-
ception of distance.
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Table 1.2: Laboratory Demographics
Number of subjects n = 81
Gender (n = 80) 41.3% male; 58.8% female
Age (n = 80) Average: 23.00; St. dev.: 4.17
Highest level of education achieved (n = 81)
Some post-secondary 44.4%
Completed bachelor’s degree 29.6%
Completed graduate or professional degree 25.9%
Area of study (n = 80)
Economics, psychology, or neuroscience 24.7%
1.7.1 Demographic Data
Table 1.2 lists basic demographic data for the laboratory subjects. The pool is fairly
gender-balanced;²³ the null of perfect gender balance cannot be rejected (two-sided test of
proportions, p = 0:146). The pool is also highly educated; over 55% of laboratory subjects
have completed a post-secondary degree.
1.7.2 Choice Data
The data we are most interested in for each task t are the incentive level rt, the true state
of nature t, and the subject’s response at. For each task, define the subject’s correctness
as yt := 1ftg (at). That is, yt takes the value 1 if the subject correctly determined the state
of nature in task t and 0 otherwise.
We are primarily interested in the relationship between correctness and incentive
level. We can think of the pattern of successes and failures that we observe as be-
ing generated by some underlying data-generating process that for every possible re-
ward level tells us the probability of answering correctly. We denote this probability by
²³Subjects were given the option to list their gender as “other/non-binary.” No subjects used this option,



































































Figure 1.6: Isotone nonparametric regression of correctness on incentive level
Data for Laboratory Subject 3. Method of Dette et al. (2006).
Pt := Pr(yt = 1jrt) = Pr(at = tjrt) for each task t; in other words, the underlying
data-generating process is the performance function. Using the correctness data allows
us to infer properties of the performance function, which in turn allows us to infer prop-
erties of the cost function that generated it. (Figure 1.6 provides an example of what such
a performance function might look like.)
In particular, we can answer some of the questions raised in the introduction:
• Do subjects behave in a manner consistent with the predictions of rational inatten-
tion?
• Do they respond to incentives?
• Do they exhibit evidence of non-convexities or discontinuities in their cost func-
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Figure 1.7: Categorization of subjects
tions? (Put differently, are their cost functions not “well-behaved”?)
• Do they evince the perception of distance?
We are able to categorize subjects according to their answers to these questions. First, we
classify them by whether or not they are rationally inattentive. Then, we classify ratio-
nally inattentive subjects by whether or not they are responsive to incentives. This subset
of subjects is the subset of greatest interest to us; these are the subjects for whom we can
estimate performance functions and back out corresponding information cost functions.
We classify responsive subjects according to whether or not their behavior is consistent
with “well-behaved” (i.e. continuous, convex) cost functions. Finally, we classify all ra-
tionally inattentive subjects according to whether or not they evince the perception of
distance. This categorization scheme is illustrated in Figure 1.7.
However, before proceedingwith this categorization exercise, we analyze the subjects’
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data in the aggregate.
1.7.3 Aggregate Analysis
Table 1.3: Regressions of correctness on incentive level and demographic covariates
(1) (2)




















Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Standard errors clustered on subject.
Table 1.3 displays a regression of correctness on incentive level. The regression in
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column 2 includes demographic covariates, including age (in years) and dummies for
maleness, holding at least a bachelor’s degree, studying economics, psychology, or neuro-
science, participating in the $20 prize treatment, and being shown the “dots” tasks before
the “angle” tasks. It also controls for the order in which tasks were completed.
It is apparent that in the aggregate, performance is higher at higher incentive levels. In
particular, on average each increase of 1 point in incentive level results in a 0.3% increase
in the probability of answering correctly.
For the most part, demographic covariates have no significant effect on performance.
Moreover, there is no significant effect of doing the “dots” tasks before the “angle” tasks.
However, performance does decline slightly over time, indicating that subjects may ex-
perience some fatigue.²⁴
1.7.4 Rational Inattentiveness
We now proceed with the individual-level categorization exercise.
Before testing the properties of the subjects’ cost functions, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether there exists a cost function that rationalizes their data in the first place.
To that end, we test the necessary and sufficient “no improving attention cycles” and “no
improving action switches” conditions by testing the equivalent conditions established in
²⁴The effect of task number on performance vanishes if we only consider the second half of the data, i.e.
the last 50 tasks for each subject. (Recall that the first fifty tasks contained the odd-numbered incentives,
and the last fifty tasks contained the even-numbered incentives, so each half of the data contains the same
range variation in incentives as the whole data set.) This is consistent with some portion of the subjects
choosing to exert effort early in the experiment before succumbing to fatigue. As further evidence of this
explanation, we find fewer subjects who are responsive to incentives when considering only the last fifty
tasks as compared to when considering all tasks (33 (40.7%) as compared to 45 (55.6%)). In that case, the
subsequent individual-level analysis can be thought of as estimating behavior in the first half of the data,
with random noise coming from the second half of the data for subjects who stop exerting effort.
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Subsection 1.3.3.
1.7.4.1 No Improving Attention Cycles
As demonstrated in Proposition 5, a subject satisfies NIAC in our experiment if and only
if their probability of correctly guessing the state is non-decreasing in the reward. This
implies that rationally inattentive subjects have non-decreasing performance functions.
At this point, a clarification is in order. As we showed in Proposition 5, NIAC holds
in a set of uniform guess tasks iff for any pair of decision problems (r1; r2) with r1 > r2,
we have that P (r1)  P (r2). Observationally, this means that the subject had more
correct answers under incentive level r1 than incentive level r2. However, in our experi-
ment each subject is given each decision problem only once. Therefore, the empirically-
observed probabilities of answering each decision problem correctly are either 0 or 1. If
were to apply the NIAC condition directly to our data, this would mean that the only
subjects whose behavior is consistent with NIAC would be those who always answer in-
correctly up to some incentive threshold after which they always answer correctly. Given
the stochasticity of choice under limited attention, this scenario is implausible.
Therefore, rather than strictly interpreting our data as stochastic choice data and
making direct pairwise comparisons of decision problems to test NIAC, we adopt an
estimation-based approach. We estimate the performance function given correctness data
and see if this estimate is significantly different from a non-decreasing function, in which
case we reject NIAC. In theory, unless there is some reward threshold below which the
subject is never correct and above which the subject is always correct, the fit of a mono-
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Figure 1.8: Unrestricted cubic polynomial regression of correctness on incentive level for
Subjects 1 and 19. The former rejects NIAC (and therefore rejects rational inattentiveness),
and the latter fails to reject NIAC.
then, that we wish to pose is not whether a non-monotone or decreasing function can fit
the data, but whetherwe can reject the hypothesis that a non-decreasing function explains
the data.
To test for weak positive monotonicity, we employ a method developed by Doveh
et al. (2002) and compare the estimation of an unrestricted cubic polynomial regression of
correctness on incentive level for each subject to one with a positive derivative restriction.
The null hypothesis for this test is that the response function ismonotonic. At the 5% level,
we fail to reject positive monotonicity for 77 out of 81 lab subjects (95.1%).²⁵ Examples of
polynomial regressions and correctness data for two subjects, one who rejects NIAC and
one who fails to reject NIAC, are depicted in Figure 1.8.
²⁵The optimization in the computation of the restricted regression for lab subject 35 failed to converge,
and sowe did not perform the test for them. For that subject, a one-tailed t-test of the coefficient on incentive
level in a linear regression of correctness on incentive level failed to reject the null of the coefficient being
non-negative at the 5% level, and so we classify them as having a non-decreasing performance function.
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1.7.4.2 No Improving Action Switches
To test for the second necessary and sufficient condition for rational inattentiveness,
NIAS, we cannot simply simply examine the estimated performance function; we must
look at the posterior probabilities of each state given each response. We employ a boot-
strap procedure. For each subject and response, we calculate the empirically observed
distribution of true states, i.e. we calculate Pr(ja). We then simulate 499 bootstrap sam-
ples for each distribution.²⁶ If the most common true state is the one corresponding to the
response in at least 5% of samples for each response for a given subject, then that subject
fails to reject NIAS. Overall, we find that 74 out of 81 (91.3%) laboratory subjects fail to
reject NIAS.
Overall, 70 out of 81 (86.4%) laboratory subjects fail to reject both NIAC and NIAS. We
refer to these subjects as “rationally inattentive,” or simply “rational,” subjects.
1.7.5 Responsiveness
Of the subjects who fail to reject rational inattentiveness, some of them may have flat
response functions, i.e. while they could be rationally inattentive, they do not actually
respond to incentives (within the range of incentives presented to them).
To determine which subjects are responsive to incentives, for each subject who failed
to reject rational inattentiveness, we run a linear weighted least squares regression of
correctness on incentive level and run a one-sided t-test of the coefficient on incentive
level with the null of non-positivity, i.e. non-responsiveness to incentives. However, this
²⁶Simulating 1 fewer than 500 bootstrap samples ensures that Type I error probabilities are exact (cf.





































































































































Figure 1.9: Linear regressions of correctness on incentive level for two subjects. The left
panel shows an unresponsive subject, and the right panel shows a responsive one.
is insufficient to capture all responsive subjects; a subject may be responsive only within a
small range of incentives. To address this issue, for each subject, we repeat this procedure
on incentive levels 1 through 50 and on incentive levels 51 through 100.²⁷ If a subject has a
significantly positive coefficient on incentive level in any of these three regressions, then
we classify them as responsive.²⁸
At the 5% significance level, 42 out of 70 lab subjects (60.0%) who fail to reject rational
inattentiveness are responsive to incentives. Examples of full-sample linear regressions
and correctness data for two subjects, one who fails to reject non-responsiveness and one
who rejects non-responsiveness, are depicted in Figure 1.9.
²⁷Further sample splitting leads to the spurious detection of responsiveness; it leads to some subjects
with >95% success being classified as responsive.
²⁸We must consider the full-sample regressions in tandem with the split-sample regressions. If we con-
sidered only the split-sample regressions, then we would classify subjects who have binary-response per-
formance functions with thresholds around 50 as non-responsive.
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1.7.6 Continuity and Convexity
If the assumptions of Propositions 7, 9, 11, or 12 are satisfied (the cost function is almost
strictly convex, the cost function is a strictly convex function of accuracy, the cost func-
tion implies convexity in the square root of the precision of a normal signal, or the cost
function is mutual information, respectively), then the performance function should be
continuous in r. Therefore, observing a discontinuity in the performance function is an
indication that the cost function is not almost strictly convex in the information structure,
strictly convex in the probability of correctly determining the state, strictly convex in the
square root of the precision of a normally-distributed signal, or mutual information, i.e.
there is some violation of convexity.
Strictly speaking, one cannot definitively observe a discontinuity without an infinite
data set; a continuous function with a sufficiently steep slope at points of potential dis-
continuity can always be used to fit finite data. Therefore, for each subject, the question
we wish to answer is whether it is more plausible that a discontinuous performance func-
tion or a continuous performance function generated their correctness data. This implies
a statistical test where the null hypothesis is that the performance function belongs to
some class of discontinuous functions, and the alternative is that the performance func-
tion belongs to some class of continuous functions.
We test for the presence of a discontinuity by applying a likelihood ratio test. We
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estimate a regression of the form:²⁹
Pt = 0 + 11(rt) (1.16)
where 0, 1, and  are the parameters to be estimated and compare its likelihood to an
estimation of the following logistic relationship:
Pt =
1
1 + exp( (rt   )) + 0 (1.17)
It can be shown that (1.16) is the pointwise limit of (1.17) as  goes to infinity. Therefore,
(1.16) can be seen as the restricted null model, and a likelihood ratio test comparing these
models is effectively a test of the null hypothesis that  = 1, i.e. it is a test against
the null hypothesis that there is a jump discontinuity. Since we are performing this test
only on responsive subjects, our estimates of 1 for each subject should be positive, and
therefore this procedure should not detect spurious downward jump discontinuities for
those subjects.³⁰
Using this test, at the 5% level we cannot reject that 29 out of 42 responsive lab subjects
(69.0%) have discontinuities in their response functions.
²⁹We use the procedure of Bai and Perron (1998) for this estimation.
³⁰Several procedures for detecting discontinuities have been proposed in the econometric literature.
See, for example, Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994), Bai and Perron (1998), and Porter and Yu
(2015). All of these procedures are designed to detect both positive and negative jump discontinuities, and
so they are vulnerable to the detection of spurious negative jumps in our setting. A clarification is in order
here. Bai and Perron (1998) propose both an estimation procedure and a testing procedure for models with
structural breaks with unknown discontinuity points. We use their estimation procedure to estimate (1.16),
but we do not use their testing procedure.
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1.7.7 Perceptual Distance
Amutual-information cost function, among others, does not embed a concept of perpetual
distance. What that means in our experiment is that mutual information predicts that
given a true state of nature, each incorrect response is equally likely. For example, if
the true number of dots is 39, reporting 42 should be just as likely as reporting 38, even
though the difference between 42 and 39 is 3, whereas the difference between 38 and
39 is 1. Taking absolute value as the natural metric on f38; : : : ; 42g, this means that if
a subject evinces perceptual distance, then given a true state of 39, she should be more
likely to report 38 than 42.
For each subject and trial t, we compute the error distance (at; t) = jat  tj. In our
experiment this distance in an integer in f1; 2; 3; 4g. In order to test this symmetry pre-
diction of the mutual information cost function, for each responsive subject we compute
the distribution of error distances that mutual information would predict, given the em-
pirically observed distribution of true states and the subject’s overall accuracy rate. We
then compare the empirically observed distribution of error distances to this distribution
using a chi-square test.
At the 5% level, we find that 26 out of 42 responsive lab subjects (61.9%) have a distribu-
tion of mistakes that evinces the perception of distance. Of course, the notion that percep-
tual distance matters for error distance distributions is not limited to responsive subjects;
mutual information implies responsiveness (i.e. a strictly increasing performance func-
tion), so subjects who are not responsive have already rejected mutual information for
other reasons. But as a test of the general notion that each possible mistake is equally
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Table 1.4: Categorization of subjects
Category Of All Subjects Of R.I. Subjects Of Resp. Subjects Of P.D. Subjects
All subjects 81 (100%) — — —
R.I. subjects 70 (86.4%) 70 (100%) — —
Resp. subjects /// 42 (60.0%) 42 (100%) 26 (57.8%)
W.B. subjects /// /// 13 (31.0%) 8 (17.8%)
P.D. subjects /// 45 (64.3%) 26 (61.9%) 45 (100%)
Note: “R.I.” = rationally inattentive; “Resp.” = responsive; “W.B.” = well-behaved, i.e. subjects whose
behavior is consistent with continuous, convex cost functions; “P.D. Subjects” = subjects who evince
the perception of distance. — denotes that the column category is a subset of the row category, and ///
denotes that the row category is defined only on a subset of the column category.
likely given an true state of nature, it is worth running these tests on the entire pool
of rationally inattentive subjects. At the 5% level, we find that 45 out of 70 rationally
inattentive lab subjects (64.3%) reject this hypothesis.
1.7.8 Summary of Categorization
Table 1.4 summarizes the results of preceding subsections. Each cell indicates the num-
ber and percentage of row category subjects in the column category. It should be noted
that the vast majority (86.4%) of subjects are rationally inattentive, and moreover, most
rationally inattentive subjects are responsive (60.0%). Also of note is the fact that most
rationally inattentive subjects evince the perception of distance (64.3%).
1.8 Model Selection
In this section, for each responsive subject we fit several possible parametric functional
forms for performance functions, each of which can be generated by some cost function.
53
Table 1.5: Performance functions estimated and their corresponding cost functions
Cost Function Performance Function Estimation
1 Very high or low marginal or absolute costs Constant OLS
2 Dual-process or concave Binary BP98
3 Quadratic in accuracy Affine WLS
4 Discontinuous or has non-convexity Affine with break BP98
5 Integral of inverse of 2nd degree polynomial in accuracy 2nd degree polynomial WLS
6 Integral of inverse of 3rd degree polynomial in accuracy 3rd degree polynomial WLS
7 Mutual information or logit cost Logistic MLE
8 Normal signals with linear cost of precision Concave MLE
Note: BP98 = Bai and Perron (1998)
These models are listed in Table 1.5.³¹
1.8.1 Description of Models
We now describe each of these models.
Model 1. Since we perform this model selection exercise only on responsive subjects,
we fit a constant performance function as a robustness check. A flat performance function
obtains when there is a single performance level such that a subject’s cost for higher
performance is too high to warrant improvement for any incentive level and their savings
in terms of information costs are too low to warrant lowering their performance at any
incentive level.
Models 2 and 4. These models have discontinuous performance functions, implying
by Proposition 7, 9, 11, or 12 that the corresponding cost functions have some violation
of convexity or continuity. We estimate Model 2 by:
Pt = 0 + 11(rt) (1.18)
³¹The reason that we do not consider the channel capacity cost function is because since the prior dis-
tribution in our task is uniform, channel capacity would be consistent with the same behavior as mutual
information (cf. Section 1.2.3 of Woodford, 2012)
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and Model 4 by:
Pt = 0 + 11(rt) + 2rt + 3rt  1(rt) (1.19)
where  is the location of the discontinuity, using the linear structural change estimation
technique of Bai and Perron (1998).
Given the estimates of (1.18), we can recover the parameters of the corresponding
fixed-cost information cost function (1.9). It is clear that q = ^0 and q = ^0 + ^1. As
shown in Subsection 1.5.4, the location  of the discontinuity in the performance function
is given by 
q q . Therefore,  = ^(^1   ^0).
A performance function of the form of (1.18) could also be obtained from a concave
information cost function. To illustrate, consider for simplicity a subject who has a cost
function K that is concave in performance, as depicted in Figure 1.10.
Net payoffs are maximized when the positive distance between gross payoffs and costs
is largest. For low reward levels (such as r1), this happens at the no-information perfor-
mance level, 0.2. For high reward levels (such as r2), this happens at the full-information
performance level, 1. In this manner, a binary performance function obtains, with the
subject acquiring no information if the incentive is low and acquiring full information if
the incentive level is high.
Model 4 nests Model 2, and so it can correspond to a wider class of cost functions,
including those of similar form to (1.9), but with two convex components as opposed to
only two admissible information structures.













































Figure 1.10: Concave costs
since these models are estimated only for responsive subjects, these estimated perfor-
mance functions should be increasing. As explained in Subsection 1.5.4, this means we
can recover the corresponding information cost functions by inverting and taking the
antiderivative of the estimated performance functions. While the quadratic and cubic
performance functions of Models 5 and 6 do not have very simple closed forms for their
corresponding cost functions, Model 3’s corresponding cost function can be easily recov-
ered from its estimate:
Pt = 0 + 1rt (1.20)
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In this case, inverting and integrating the performance function gives us the performance-




(P 2   0:04)  ^0
^1
(P   0:2) (1.21)
assuming that K   1
n

= 0, i.e. that acquiring no information entails no cost.
Model 7. As we showed in Proposition 9, a mutual information cost function implies









However, Proposition 9 also implies that if a subject evinces the perception distance, then
they cannot have a mutual information cost function. To reconcile logistic performance
with perceptual distance, one can assume that the subject actually has a performance-
dependent cost function and apply the inversion-and-integration procedure of Subsection
1.5.4. This gives the following “logit” cost function (assuming that acquiring no informa-
tion entails no cost):







+ ln(1  P ) + ln(1:25)

(1.23)
Model 8. For this model, we assume that the subject receives normal signals with
precision 2 and the cost of a signal is linear in precision, as in the numerical example
of Section 5 of Verrecchia (1982). Therefore, the cost of a signal is K() = 2.  is the
parameter we wish to estimate for each subject.
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Table 1.6: Model Selection for Responsive Subjects
Model Binary (2) Logistic (7) Concave (8)
Number of Subjects 10 (23.8%) 26 (61.9%) 6 (14.3%)






















1.8.2 Comparison of Models
We now run a “horse race” to determine which model is the best fit for each subject.
Since the models are non-nested and are estimated using different estimation techniques,
we cannot use a traditional auxiliary regressionmethod for model selection. To determine
which model is the best fit for each responsive subject, we estimate each model for each
such subject and then compare their Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) (cf. Section 8.5 of
Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), selecting the model that yields the lowest AIC. The results
of this selection are given in Table 1.6.
All responsive subjects are best fit by binary (fixed costs), logistic (mutual information
or “logit” performance dependence), or concave performance (normal signals with linear
precision cost). The first implies some sort of non-convexity or discontinuity in the cost
function, whereas the latter two are consistent with convex cost functions. Figures 1.11,
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Figure 1.11: Best-fit binary performance
This figure shows the fits of binary, logistic, and concave (normal) performance for Subject
6, with the best-fitting binary model in red.
1.12, and 1.13 show what these performance functions look like for three subjects.
Table 1.7 shows the average estimatedAIC and rank of eachmodel in the “horse race.”³²
Models 2 (binary), 3 (affine), and 7 (logistic) have the lowest ranks on average. Flexible
polynomial fits do quite poorly; the average rank of a cubic performance function (Model
6) is higher than that of the constant performance model (Model 1).































































Figure 1.12: Best-fit logistic performance
This figure shows the fits of binary, logistic, and concave (normal) performance for Subject
14, with the best-fitting logistic model in red.















































































Figure 1.13: Best-fit concave (normal) performance
This figure shows the fits of binary, logistic, and concave (normal) performance for Subject
66, with the best-fitting concave (normal) model in red.
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Note that the average AIC and rank for Model 7, the logistic performance function,
is lower than that of Model 2, the binary performance function, despite the fact that sig-
nificantly more subjects are best fit by Model 7 than by Model 2. This indicates that the
binary model is a decent fit when the best-fitting model is logistic, but the logistic model
is a poor fit when the best-fitting model is binary. When the logistic model is the best
fit, the average rank of the binary model is 2.577; however, when the binary model is the
best fit, the average rank of the logistic model is 4.100. Note also that the average rank of
Model 8 (normal signals with linear precision cost) is fairly high at 4.333. This indicates
that when Model 8 is not the best fit for a subject, it is a poor fit.
1.9 Additional Results
1.9.1 Categorization and Demographics
In this subsection, we determine the extent to which demographic covariates predict the
categorization of subjects as rationally inattentive and responsive, as well as whether their
best-fitting performance function is binary or logistic.
1.9.1.1 Rational Inattentiveness
To determine the extent to which demographics predict a failure to reject NIAC, we run
a logit regression of an indicator for rational inattentiveness on demographic covariates.
These covariates are age, an indicator for being male, an indicator for having attained
at least a bachelor’s degree, an indicator for studying economics, psychology, or neu-
roscience, an indicator for participating in the $20 prize treatment, and an indicator for
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$20 Prize 0.128 0.263
(0.714) (0.557)





Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
having done the dots tasks first. We display the results of this regression in column 1 of
Table 1.8.
Demographic covariates do not seem to be predictive of rational inattentiveness in
this particular subject pool. Neither do experimental variables, such as the higher prize
and completing the dots tasks first. This suggests that for a given set of tasks, rational
inattentiveness is an innate characteristic that is not well captured by demographics, and
moreover, it may be difficult to manipulate experimentally.
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1.9.1.2 Responsiveness
To determine the extent to which demographics predict responsiveness, we run a logit
regression of an indicator for responsiveness on demographic covariates for the subjects
who fail to reject rational inattentiveness. We display the results of this regression in
column 2 of Table 1.8.
As is the case with rational inattentiveness, demographic covariates are not significant
predictors of responsiveness.
Table 1.9: Model Selection and Demographics









$20 Prize 0.505  0.365
(0.825) (1.255)





Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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1.9.1.3 Cost Functions
To determine the extent to which demographics predict model selection, we run a multi-
nomial logit regression of the best-fittingmodel on the same set of demographic covariates
as in previous subsubsections, with logistic performance (Model 7, mutual-information
costs) as the baseline. This regression shows us the extent to which these demographic
factors affect the likelihood of selecting a model that implies a non-convexity or discon-
tinuity in the cost function over one that is consistent with convexity. We display the
results of this regression in Table 1.9.
As is the case with previous demographic regressions, demographic factors are not
significant predictors. This seems to indicate that not only is rational inattentiveness not
well captured by demographics, so is the nature of one’s cost function for information in
a given task.
1.9.2 Reaction Times
In addition to data on subject responses, we also collected data on howmuch time subjects
spent on each task. We call this the reaction time.
1.9.2.1 Time and Attention
Thus far, in this paper, we have remained agnostic about the exact nature of what atten-
tion comprises, and by corollary, we have remained agnostic about the exact source of
information costs. One possibility is that attention can be decomposed into a quantity
component — time spent on a task — and a quality component — how much effort is ex-
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erted during that time. Here, we provide some suggestive evidence that attention indeed
has a quantity component.








Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Standard errors clustered on subject.








Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Standard errors clustered on subject.
Tables 1.10 and 1.11 display linear regressions of reaction time on incentive level and
correctness on incentive level, respectively, aggregating over the subject pool. The co-
efficients on the dependent variables in both regressions are positive and significant. In
the case of the first regression, this indicates that subjects respond to higher incentives
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by increasing the quantity of attention paid to the task at hand. In the case of the sec-
ond regression, this indicates that increasing the quantity of attention results in higher
performance; this is the speed-accuracy trade-off commonly noted in the literature on
perceptual psychology (e.g. Schouten and Bekker, 1967).
1.9.2.2 Dual-Process Mechanisms
As we showed in Subsection 1.8.2, choice data for approximately one-third of responsive
subjects are best fit by binary performance functions. This suggests that these subjects
employ two different strategies for determining the number of dots on the screen — one
for low incentives, and one for high incentives. In this subsubsection, we provide further
suggestive evidence for this hypothesis.
Figure 1.14 shows the histogram of reaction time on every task for the subject popula-
tion. The distribution of reaction times is clearly bimodal. There are at least two possible,
non-mutually exclusive explanations for this. One is that some portion of the subjects
simply do not exert any effort on the task and make a response at the earliest oppor-
tunity, while others exert effort in acquiring information. Another is that subjects have
binary performance functions, choosing not to spend time acquiring information for some
incentive levels but choosing to do so for others.
The fact that a significant portion of subjects are best fit by binary performance func-
tions provides an explanation for the pattern observed in Figure 1.14. Some subjects make
snap decisions when confronted with low incentives but take the time to acquire informa-
tion at higher incentive levels. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 1.15, which shows
the histogram of reaction time on every task for responsive subjects only. Observe that
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Figure 1.14: Histogram of reaction times for all subjects
this histogram is also clearly bimodal.
To interrogate this question further, we run the dip test of Hartigan and Hartigan
(1985) on each subject’s reaction times to determine which ones have multimodal reac-
tion time distributions. We can reject the null of unimodality at the 5% level for 26 out of
42 responsive subjects (61.9%). This is more than the number of responsive subjects whose
data are best fit by binary performance functions, meaning that some subjects with logis-
tic or concave performance functions do not have unimodal reaction time distributions.
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Figure 1.15: Histogram of reaction times for responsive subjects
This suggests that rather than continuously adjusting their quantity of attention as incen-
tive levels increase, some subjects randomize between paying a high quantity and a low
quantity of attention, and the probability of paying a high quantity of attention increases
as incentive levels increase.
This evidence implies that for a large portion of the subject pool (61.9%), there are
two information-acquisition processes that they can employ in this task. Still, there is a
significant portion of the pool (38.1%) that is apparently able to adjust their quantity of
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attention continuously. As was the case with previous categorizations of subjects, there
is significant heterogeneity.
1.10 Application to the Delegation of Investment
The characteristics of the decision-maker’s cost function can obviously have effects on
her own decisions. But as we show in this section, these characteristics can also have
effects on economically-relevant outcomes when there is strategic interaction.
In order to demonstrate this notion, let us consider a situation in which an investor is
decidingwhich of n options to invest in, and he cannot split his investment across options.
Suppose that only one of these options can be a winner, in which case an investment in
it will pay a net return of x. Losing opportunities pay a net return of zero. This setup has
the relevant features of a situation where the success of an investment depends on the
outcome of a contest. Many economic situations, such as competing to be granted devel-
opment rights by the government for a plot of land, take the form of contests. Another
salient example is a patent race, where various firms compete to be the first to patent an
invention, such as a drug or a piece of technology.
Suppose that the investor wishes to delegate researching these options to an expert.
This is a common occurrence in reality; people frequently solicit the services of financial
advisors, presumably because it is prohibitively difficult or costly for laypeople to research
investment opportunities themselves, while financial advisors who are trained to seek and
interpret financial information can research these opportunities at a much lower cost.
We can analyze this situation in a simple principal-agent framework, where the in-
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vestor is the principal and the expert is the agent.³³ The agent acquires information about
the available investment opportunities at a cost and selects one of the options on the prin-
cipal’s behalf. Suppose that the principal employs the agent with a contract that pays r
if the agent correctly selects the winner and zero otherwise.³⁴ Furthermore, suppose that
a priori, each option is equally likely to be the winner. Then, the agent’s problem can
be represented as a uniform guess task, with the reward for a correct answer being r.
Consequently, the principal’s problem is
max
r2[0;x]
(x  r)P (r) (1.26)
where P (r) is the agent’s performance function.
As we established in Proposition 5, if the agent is rationally inattentive, then her per-
formance function is (weakly) increasing. Thus, the principal faces a trade-off between
incentivizing the agent to acquire better information and giving up a larger portion of
his net return upon success. The exact nature of this trade-off depends on the potential
net return x and the agent’s information cost function. In the following subsections, we
analyze the properties of the principal’s optimal payment strategy r under the three cost
functionmodels fit by our data: fixed costs; mutual information; and normally-distributed
signals.³⁵
³³We use male pronouns for the principal and female pronouns for the agent.
³⁴This type of contract is optimal for the principal if we assume that (a) there is a limited-liability con-
straint so that the agent cannot earn a negative payoff in any state of the world, which implies that the
principal cannot “sell the firm” to the agent; and (b) the agent’s cost of an uninformative information struc-
ture is zero. As CD15 demonstrate, the latter assumption is without loss of generality; it is not a testable
restriction on information cost functions.
³⁵Some caution is required in applying the assumption of normally-distributed signals, because it im-
plies that the options have some existing ranking, and it is not clear what it means for the options to be
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1.10.1 Fixed Costs
Suppose the agent has a fixed cost  for acquiring information. If she pays the cost, then
she learns the winner with certainty. If not, then she learns nothing about the identity of
the winner. Thus, she chooses to acquire information if r     r
n
, i.e. when r  n
n 1 .
Therefore, if x < n
n 1 , then the reward required to incentivize the agent to acquire
information is higher than the potential net return, so the principal is better off not hiring
the agent at all and simply picking an option at random. If instead x  n
n 1 , then the
principal could incentivize information acquisition by paying as little as r = n
n 1 . To




n 1 , which holds if and only if x  n
2
(n 1)2 . But since nn 1 < n
2
(n 1)2 ,
the principal will not hire the agent unless x  n2
(n 1)2 .
To summarize: if x < n2
(n 1)2 , then the principal does not hire the agent and selects an
option at random. If x  n2
(n 1)2 , then the principal hires the agent and gives her a payment
of n
n 1 , and the agent picks the winner with certainty. This implies a discontinuity in the
principal’s payment as a function of the potential net return x. Figure 1.16 shows what
this payment scheme looks like for  = 40.
1.10.2 Mutual Information
Suppose the agent has a mutual-information cost function with cost parameter . Then,
since her performance function is logistic (see Proposition 9), the principal chooses r to
“equidistant” from each other. In any case, if the normal-signals model is excluded from consideration,
then in our data, the best-fitting model for each subject is either binary (fixed costs) or logistic (mutual
information). (Results available from the authors on request.)
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Figure 1.16: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, fixed costs
maximize:
x  r





If this maximand is strictly quasiconcave, then this problem has a unique solution for
each x, and the maximum theorem guarantees that the principal’s optimal choice of r is
continuous in x. This turns out to be the case.
Proposition 13. If the agent has a mutual information cost function, then the principal’s
optimal payment strategy r(x) is continuous.
To provide an example, suppose n = 5,  = 10, and x 2 [5; 100]. As shown by
Proposition 13, the maximand (1.27) is strictly quasiconcave in r (see Figure 1.17 for an
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Figure 1.17: Principal’s expected payoff as a function of payment for x = 20, mutual
information costs
example). For these parameters, r(x) is continuous and increasing, as shown in Figure
1.18.
1.10.3 Normally-Distributed Signals
Suppose that the options are ranked and equidistant on some scale. For example, in the
case of bidding for development rights, the projects could be ranked by the estimated
length of time until project completion.³⁶ In this case, if the agent’s cost function satisfies
the conditions of Proposition 11, then it can be shown that the principal’s optimal choice
of r is continuous in x.
³⁶Shorter completion times mean that the development will be more quickly available for public use,
but may also signal poor craftsmanship.
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Figure 1.18: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, mutual information
costs
Proposition 14. If the options are ranked and equidistant, and the agent has a convex, in-
creasing cost of precision of normal signals with non-negative third derivative, then the prin-
cipal’s optimal payment strategy r(x) is continuous.
Figure 1.19 shows what this payment scheme looks like if costs are linear in the pre-
cision of normally-distributed signals, with a marginal cost of precision of 7.5.
1.10.4 Hybrid Models
The previous subsections have studied the investment delegation model under the as-
sumption of a single type of cost function. However, the results of Section 1.8 indicate
that there is heterogeneity in individuals’ cost function types in the population.
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Figure 1.19: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, normally-distributed
signals
To address this heterogeneity, we simulate the investment delegation model with a
population of agents, each of which could have a fixed costs ( = 40), mutual information
( = 10), or linear precision in normally-distributed signals (marginal cost of precision
7.5) for their cost function.³⁷
Figures 1.20 and 1.21 show the principal’s optimal payment scheme in this hybrid
model. Figure 1.20 uses the proportion of each cost function type found among responsive
subjects in our population, while Figure 1.21 uses a population with 50% fixed-cost agents,
40% mutual-information agents, and 10% normal-signal agents. Notice that the optimal
payment scheme of the hybridmodel resembles amixture of the optimal payment schemes
for each of the individual cost function types, with, going from left to right, a flat region,
³⁷We assume that agents are rationally inattentive and responsive.
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Figure 1.20: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, hybrid model with
empirical proportions of types
Figure 1.21: Optimal payment as a function of potential net return, hybrid model with
50% fixed-cost types
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followed by a region of strict increase, followed by another flat region. These flat regions
increase in size when the proportion of fixed-cost agents is increased.
The examples of this section demonstrate that the characteristics of an agent’s infor-
mation cost function can affect how a principal’s decisions change with the parameters
of his environment. Some cost functions, like the fixed-cost function described above, in-
duce the principal to pay for information acquisition only when the potential net return
is sufficiently high. Others, like the mutual information cost function, cause the principal
to vary his payment continuously with changing potential net returns. In hybrid models
combining these cost functions, the optimal payment scheme resembles a mixture of the
optimal payments of the component cost function types.
1.11 Conclusion
This paper has provided a framework for testing properties of information cost functions
in models of rational inattention. To the extent that the presence or absence of charac-
teristics such as continuity, convexity, and perceptual distance can have an impact on
people’s decisions, it is worth knowing whether their cost functions satisfy such condi-
tions. Decision-makers’ cost functions are not directly observable, so instead we must
infer their characteristics from observed behavior. We conducted a set of experiments
that allowed us to implement these tests.
These experiments reveal substantial heterogeneity in behavior. Most subjects are
rationally inattentive, but only about half are actually responsive to incentives. Many
subjects have behavior that is consistent with continuous, convex cost functions, and
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many subjects have behavior that evince the perception of distance as well. Moreover,
there is considerable heterogeneity in whether or not subjects finely adjust their quantity
of attention, though this heterogeneity is limited to three classes of cost functions: fixed
costs, mutual information, and normal signals are the only best-fitting cost functions for
responsive subjects in terms of performance.
This has implications for modeling. In models where agents acquire information, it
is perhaps a better reflection of reality to allow for some heterogeneity in their funda-
mentals. In particular, one may want to model some portion of the population as non-
responsive to incentives for information acquisition, or among responsive incentives, one
could designate some as having fixed costs for information acquisition and others as hav-
ing mutual-information or normal-signal cost functions.
Two possible avenues for future experimental research present themselves. The first
is to obtain more detailed data on what subjects are actually paying attention to. Eye-
tracking has already been used in several economics experiments (e.g. Wang et al., 2010;
Krajbich et al., 2010; Arieli et al., 2011) to track subjects’ gaze, which allows researchers
to find out what visual information the subjects are acquiring. Tracking subjects’ mouse
movements in computer-based tasks (e.g. Gabaix et al., 2006) is another potential ap-
proach. The second is to use choice data in tandem with reaction time data to fit models
of dynamic information acquisition. This would also allow researchers to determine to
what extent subjects trade off speed and accuracy in their decision-making.
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Chapter 2
Promises and Pronouncements
This chapter is coauthored with Charles Maurin.
2.1 Introduction
Researchers have long been interested in what motivates dishonest behavior. Mazar et al.
(2008) theorize that it the result of a trade-off between positive self-concept maintenance
and rational self-interest; when the latter dominates the former, then an individual lies.¹
This is consistent with previous findings by Kashy and DePaulo (1996), who note that
people who are more concerned with impression management tell more lies.
Another notable finding of Kashy and DePaulo (1996) is that people whose personal-
ities indicate higher levels of social responsibility are less likely to tell selfish lies. This
raises the question: if the level of responsibility that one felt over a situation could be
exogenously manipulated, would that have an influence on lying behavior?
For example, consider the case of an investment manager who can either report po-
tential returns to a client truthfully or guarantee a higher rate of return that he knows
will not be achieved. Suppose that the investment manager lies and guarantees the higher
¹In this paper, we purposely avoid the use of the words ”deceive” and ”deception,” so as not to invite
confusion with the concept of ”experimental deception,” where experimenters mislead or withhold crucial
information from subjects. Our experiment involves no such deception and was in fact conducted in a lab
with a strict no-deception policy.
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return. Then, when the low return is realized, he may feel more culpable if this was due
to his own intended lack of effort than if it was due to unfavorable market conditions (of
which he was aware). That is, the level of control that the investment manager has over
the final outcome may influence how responsible he feels for a bad outcome, In turn, this
may influence how likely he is to lie about the possibility of a bad outcome in the first
place.
Our experiment is designed to test if those who communicate information are more
or less likely to lie if the final outcome of an interaction is under their control. Put differ-
ently, we aim to study if there is a different propensity to lie when making a promise — a
statement of intent to commit actions in the future — versus when making a pronounce-
ment — a statement about a variable outside of the communicator’s control. This research
question is relevant in management and economics, as illustrated by the example of the
investment manager, but not just to questions of investment. If our hypothesis that state-
ments of intent are less likely to be false than statements about uncontrolled variables,
then this provides an argument against delegation; a supervisor would be less likely to lie
about a project under her direct control than one delegated to her subordinates.²
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of related literature. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the game we study and derives predictions for how the game is played
under both standard cheap talk and lying costs. Section 4 presents our experimental de-
sign and explain how the game studied in Section 3 is implemented in a laboratory setting.
Section 5 presents experimental results. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
²Of course, delegation may provide benefits in terms of efficiency. To the extent that lies are socially
harmful, there may be a trade-off between the efficiency of delegation and the resulting dishonesty.
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2.2 Related Literature
Since Gneezy (2005), there has been a large experimental literature on lying in economic
interactions.³ Most of this literature studies games with variations on a simple sender-
receiver paradigm and finds evidence of lying aversion. However, the literature does not
usually explicitly distinguish between experiments involving promises and experiments
involving pronouncements; i.e. it does not study these as separate phenomena. Here, we
separate the two strands of literature.
2.2.1 Promises
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) study a trust game where the trustee can send a free-
form pre-play message to the truster. They find that pre-play communication increases
trust, especially when the message is promissory, and that it also increases cooperation.
In a related paper (2010), the authors perform the same experiment but with a pre-defined
message, and relative to their earlier paper, they find that the increases in trust and co-
operation are reduced but still significant.
Vanberg (2008) studies a similar game to Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), but ran-
domly rematches a portion of subjects after pre-play communication, while letting re-
matched subjects look at the exchange of communication between the previous pair. He
finds that breaking the promissory link between truster and trustee reduces the level of
cooperation. This evidence strongly suggests that people’s propensity to keep promises
not only depends on the potential outcomes of others but also on a feeling of who should
³An inexhaustive survey of this literature can be found in Rosenbaum et al. (2014)
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be responsible for engendering those outcomes.
More recent experiments have also used a design similar to Charness and Dufwen-
berg’s (2006) design. Tadelis (2011) studies the same game as Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006), but varies the degree to which the trustee’s decision to break a promise is revealed
with certainty ex post across treatments. He finds that the potential for such revelation
increases cooperation. Ismayilov and Potters (2015) run an experiment where it is possible
for a message not to be delivered to the recipient and find that more trustworthy senders
make promises, rather than promises inducing trustworthiness. In another variation of
the design, Ederer and Stremitzer (2015) reduce senders’ ability to keep their promises
and find that the resulting changes in players’ expectations have a negative impact on
cooperation.
2.2.2 Pronouncements
There are many experiments involving sender-receiver games where the sender takes no
additional action after communicating information to the receiver; payoffs are determined
solely by a randomly chosen state of the world and the actions chosen by the receiver.
Games such as these are very much in the spirit — and indeed are often special cases —
of the “cheap talk” games analyzed by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Green and Stokey
(2007).
At least two papers experimentally implement a version of Crawford and Sobel’s
(1982) game. Cai and Wang (2006) confirm Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) experimental
findings, but also discover evidence that senders “overcommunicate” in that their mes-
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sages are more informative about the true state of the world than would be predicted by
the most informative equilibrium. They illustrate that these findings can be explained
by boundedly rational senders who are level-k thinkers (e.g. Nagel, 1995), implying that
people may demonstrate lying aversion because it is cognitively costly. Wang et al. (2010)
confirm these findings with eyetracking data.
Other studies restrict receivers to simpler, typically binary, action spaces. Gneezy
(2005) studies a game where senders tell receivers which of two options will give them
more money, and then receivers select one of the options. He finds evidence of lying
aversion and suggests that this aversion may be increasing in the potential loss for the
receiver. Hurkens and Kartik (2009) reinterpret Gneezy’s (2005) evidence and show that
it is consistent with a model in which one portion of the population is willing to lie to get
their preferred outcome, and the remainder never lies.
Many authors have used variations of this simple cheap-talk setup to study various
issues in communication. Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) add a punishment phase to
the game to test if people have an aversion to lying per se or if they simply have preferences
over material outcomes, and they find evidence for both types of preferences. Lundquist
et al. (2009) use pre-specified messages of varying strength and find that the aversion to
lying is increasing in the strength and severity of a lie. Erat and Gneezy (2012) study
situations where lies could actually benefit receivers and find evidence of aversion to
telling even these “white lies.” Sheremeta and Shields (2013) elicit the second-order beliefs
of senders and find that liars tend to believe that their lies will be believed. Greenberg et al.
(2015) study treatments where receivers can detect ex post if senders have lied to them
and find that such treatments result in less lying, implying that senders are shame-averse.
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2.2.3 Both Promises and Pronouncements
To our knowledge, the only other paper in experimental economics that studies both
promises and pronouncements is Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). They implement
a sender-receiver game where different types of senders have different levels of abil-
ity to complete a task; thus, senders can send messages both about their ability levels
and future intentions, i.e. a message may contain both a promise and a pronouncement.
Their research question differs substantially from ours; they are primarily concerned with
whether giving all types of senders the ability to implement Pareto-improving outcomes
results in communication that can sustain cooperative outcomes — indeed, they find that
it does —whereas we are concernedwithwhether the propensity to tell a false pronounce-
ment and the propensity to break a promise differ.
2.2.4 Other Experiments
Other studies find evidence of lying aversion even in the absence of explicit strategic
considerations.⁴ Of particular note are the well-known die roll experiment of Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), which finds evidence of “partial lying,” where individuals lie
but not necessarily maximally, and an experiment by Gibson et al. (2013), which finds
significant between- and within-person heterogeneity in lying aversion. The latter study
is particularly relevant to this paper, because it provides support for the hypothesis that
⁴It is possible that experimental subjects perceive these experiments as “games” played against the
experimenters, but it is also possible that social preference effects are attenuated when subjects are not
explicitly playing against other players. For example, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) notice a shift
towards less severe lies when these lies affect another player, but this shift is not significant. However,
it should be noted that each session of their experiment was conducted immediately following another
experiment in which the subjects participated, and they did not control for this previous experiment. As
such, the insignificance of the shift should be interpreted with caution.
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lying aversion is highly context-dependent.
2.2.5 Theoretical Approaches
Various approaches have been devised to explain lying aversion. Kartik et al. (2007) and
Kartik (2009) study communication games where senders have explicit lying costs that
increase in the severity of the lie. Both papers find that if there is a non-zero possibility
for the receiver to be credulous, then the sender will engage in “language inflation” and
bias his report in the direction that he favors.
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) study psychological games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989;
Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009) where people feel guilt for causing others not to meet
their payoff expectations (not specifically for lying). The amount of guilt felt is propor-
tional to the amount by which others fall short of their expectations. Battigalli et al. (2013)
apply this guilt aversion model to Gneezy (2005) and find that their theory can explain
his results.
None of these approaches explicitly varies the costs of dishonesty with the degree
of control that the sender has over the outcome, though differences in sender behavior
between promises and pronouncements may arise in Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s (2007)
approach because of strategic considerations, as illustrated in the next section.
2.3 The Game
In this section, we outline the game on which our experimental design is based. The game
is similar in structure to the one studied by Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007). For the sake
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of readability, we assume in this section that gross utility (before applying costs of lying,
guilt, etc.) is linear and strictly increasing in money, or material payoffs, so we use the
terms “gross utility” and “material payoffs” interchangeably. The qualitative results would
be essentially unchanged if we only assumed that gross utility were strictly increasing in
material payoffs, as we demonstrate in the appendix.
There are two players: a Sender (S, “he”), and a Receiver, (R, “she”), and they could
play one of two possible scenarios, each with equal probability, a Promises scenario (),
and a Pronouncements scenario (). The Sender is informed of what scenario is being
played, but the Receiver is not.
In the Promises scenario (see Figure 2.1), the Sender chooses whether to play Left ()
or Right (). We refer to this selection as the “state.” Without observing the Sender’s
selection, the Receiver also chooses whether to play Left (`) or Right (r). If both players
go in the same direction, then they both obtain a payoff of 10. If the players go in opposite
directions, then the Sender obtains a payoff of 15, and the Receiver obtains a payoff of 0.
The Pronouncements scenario (see Figure 2.2) is identical in structure to the Promises
scenario, except the Sender’s Left/Right decision is made by Nature (N). Nature selects
either Left () or Right () as the state, each with equal probability, and then the Receiver
selects whether to go In or Out. The payoffs are as in the Promises scenario.
After the Sender learns what scenario will occur, he can choose to send a message that
encourages the Receiver to go Left (m) or to go Right (m). This message is pre-defined
and cannot be used to identify the scenario being played. In the Pronouncements scenario,
the Sender makes his messaging decision after having learned Nature’s selection of Left or
Right, and in the Promises scenario, he makes his messaging decision after having chosen
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Left or Right. In either scenario, we say that the sender “told the truth” if he sent the
message ms when the state was s and that he “lied” if he sent the message ms when the
state was y, with s 6= y. The structure of the entire game is depicted in Figure 2.3.
The advantage of using this game to study promises and pronouncements is that the
Receiver’s beliefs about the probability of Left or Right being selected are constant across
scenarios and depend only on which message was sent; i.e., she cannot infer different
meanings for a message in the different scenarios. As a result, this also fixes the Sender’s
second-order beliefs (i.e. his beliefs about the Receiver’s beliefs about the probability of
Left or Right being selected), and so the observed message-sending behavior of the Sender
cannot be affected by strategic responses to belief shifts between a Promises scenario and
Pronouncements scenario.
2.3.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In the absence of social preferences or constraints on rationality, the theoretical prediction
for the outcome of the game is that the Receiver randomizes between Left and Right,
and the Sender’s communication has no “bite” in determining the Receiver’s behavior.
This is because the two players have opposing interests; the Receiver gains when the
Sender loses, and vice versa. The Receiver randomizes evenly between Left and Right
so that the Sender cannot take advantage of her actions, and the Sender communicates
uninformatively to the Receiver so that she cannot take advantage of any information
extracted from his messages. The following proposition formalizes this:
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Figure 2.1: The Promises scenario
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Figure 2.3: The full game
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likely to send a given message in one state as in the other, and the receiver is equally likely to
go Left as to go Right upon receiving either message. Moreover, the Sender is equally likely
to select either direction in the Promise scenario.
Proof. Consider first the Receiver’s strategy. Suppose the Receiver were, WLOG, strictly
more likely to select ` than r upon receivingm, i.e. Pr(`jm) > Pr(rjm). Suppose also,
WLOG, that Pr(`jm) 2 [Pr(rjm);Pr(`jm)]. Then, the Sender’s best response would
be to always choose  and sendm in the Promise scenario, and to sendm when the state
is  and send m when the state is  in the Pronouncement scenario. But the Receiver’s
best response to that strategy would be to always play r upon receiving m and ` upon
receivingm. Therefore, the strategy originally proposed for the Receiver cannot be part
of a PBE, and so she must be equally likely to select either action after receiving either
message in equilibrium.
Now consider the Sender’s choice of action. Suppose, WLOG, that the Sender plays 
strictly more often than  in the Promises scenario, i.e. Pr(j) > Pr(j), which further
implies that Pr() > Pr(). Then for at least one of the messages mx, it must be the
case that Pr(jmx) > Pr(jmx). WLOG, this message is m. But then, the Receiver’s
best response upon receiving m is to always play `. There are now two cases. 1) If
Pr(jm)  Pr(jm), then the Receiver’s best response upon receivingm is to play `. In
that case, the Sender’s optimal actions would be to always play  in the Promise scenario
and send, WLOG,m. 2) IfPr(jm) < Pr(jm), then the Receiver’s best response upon
receiving m is to play r. In that case, the Sender could improve his expected payoff by
always playing  when he would have played ` in the original strategy and sending m
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in those situations. In either case, the strategy originally proposed for the Sender cannot
be part of a PBE, and so he must be equally likely to select either direction in the Promise
scenario, i.e. Pr(j) = Pr(j) = 1
2
, which implies that Pr() = Pr() = 1
2
Finally, consider the sender’s communication choices. Since the Sender benefits from
the Receiver mismatching the state, the Sender wishes to minimize the probability that
the Receiver can match the state. This probability is minimized when Pr(jm) =
Pr(jm) = 12 .⁵ Therefore, since Pr() = Pr() = 12 , we have by Bayes’ rule:
Pr(jm) = Pr(mj) Pr()






() Pr(mj) = Pr(mj)
Similarly, Pr(mj) = Pr(mj).
An easy corollary of this proposition is that in any PBE, the Sender is equally likely
to lie as to tell the truth. To see this, note that the ex ante probability of truth-telling is
Pr() Pr(mj)+Pr() Pr(mj), and the ex ante probability of lying isPr() Pr(mj)+
Pr() Pr(mj). But since Pr(mj) = Pr(mj) and Pr(mj) = Pr(mj), these prob-
abilities are the same.
⁵It is possible that one of the messages, say WLOG, m, is unused in equilibrium. But the Receiver’s
off-path beliefs must still be such that Pr(jm) = 12 , or else the Sender would benefit from sending mwhen the state is  if the belief is greater than 12 and sendingm when the state is  if the belief is less than
1
2 (provided the Receiver is sequentially rational in their choice of action).
93
2.3.2 Theories of Lying Aversion
As outlined in Section 2.2, in practice it is observed that people lie less often than equi-
librium would predict. There are many possible explanations for this, including simple
lying costs, guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), altruistic preferences, and
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In this subsection, we show that under the as-
sumption that Receivers are more likely to follow a message’s recommendation than not
to, none of these theories could account for differences in lying behavior across scenarios.
2.3.2.1 Lying Costs
In this subsection, we assume that Senders simply have a positive cost of lying c, of which
they are aware. For now, we proceed under the assumption that the cost of lying is not
necessarily known to the Receiver to derive the central experimental hypothesis that our
experiment is designed to test. We can distinguish between two types of lying costs: in-
tentional, which the Sender feels whenever he lies, and consequentialist, which the Sender
feels only when his lie harms the Receiver, i.e. if she actually follows the recommenda-
tion of his lie. Put differently, if the Sender has intentional lying costs, he feels them if he
sends the messagemx when the state is y, with x 6= y, and if he has consequentialist lying
costs, he feels them if in addition the Receiver takes the action f(x), where f() := ` and
f() := r.
Let PrR(yjmx) denote the Receiver’s belief that the state is y after receiving message
mx. Suppose that the Receiver is just as likely to believe a recommendation to go Left as
she is a recommendation to go Right, so that PrR(jm) = PrR(jm) =: .⁶ In order for
⁶This is an easily justifiable assumption, given the symmetry of the game.
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a Receiver to follow the Sender’s recommendation, she requires:
10  10(1  )()   1
2
(2.1)




, i.e. the Sender’s belief that the Receiver is more likely
to follow his recommendation than not.  is the Receiver’s first-order belief that the
Sender is being truthful, and  is the receiver’s second-order belief about the Receiver’s
belief about the Sender’s truthfulness. This second-order belief is crucial for analyzing
the Sender’s incentive to lie.
Proposition 16. If lying costs are intentional, the Sender is willing to lie iff c  10   5,
regardless of the scenario. If lying costs are consequentialist, the Sender is willing to lie iff
c  10 5

, regardless of the scenario.
Proof. Under intentional lying costs, the Sender’s expected payoff from lying is 15 +
10(1   )   c, and his expected payoff from telling the truth is 10 + 15(1   ). The
former is greater than the latter iff c  10   5.
Under consequentialist lying costs, the Sender’s expected payoff from lying is (15  
c) + 10(1   ), and his expected payoff from telling the truth is 10 + 15(1   ). The
former is greater than the latter iff c  10 5

.
There are several important implications to note here. Note that as long as lying costs
are sufficiently low, the Sender is wiling to lie, regardless of scenario; neither type of lying
costs implies a different propensity of breaking promises than of telling false pronounce-
ments. The upper bound below which lying is desirable increases in the second-order
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belief (for both intentional and consequentialist lying costs), meaning that Senders are
more likely to lie if they believe that their lies will be believed. Finally, note that the up-
per bound for consequentialist lying costs is higher than that for intentional ones; if the
Sender only feels a lying cost when it harms the Receiver, then he is less likely to incur
that cost and therefore more inclined to lie.
2.3.2.2 Social Preferences
It is possible that instead of being averse to lying per se, people simply have prefer-
ences over final monetary payoffs such that they feel good about good outcomes for
other players or bad about bad outcomes for other players. We call such preferences
social preferences. Formally, a social preference is a function ui, i 2 fR; Sg mapping
monetary payoff vectors (S; R) to real numbers. Examples include altruistic prefer-
ences, where a player’s psychological payoff is increasing in other’s monetary payoffs,
e.g. uS(S; R) = S + R;  > 0, and inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Because social preferences only depend on monetary distributions of payoffs, in our
game, they would be unable to explain any potential observed discrepancies between the
propensity to lie across scenarios. Moreover, if the propensity to lie does not depend
continuously on beliefs. The following proposition formalizes this:
Proposition 17. Let uA := u(15; 0) and uB := u(10; 10). The Sender is willing to lie iff
uA  uB when   12 and is willing to lie iff uA  uB when   12 , regardless of scenario.
Proof. The Sender’s expected payoff from lying is uA + uB(1   ), and his expected
payoff from telling the truth is uA(1  ) + uB. The former is weakly greater than the
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latter when uA  uB and   12 , or when uA  uB and   12 .
In other words, the Sender is willing to lie when his message is more likely to be be-
lieved than disbelieved, provided the unequal outcome gives him a greater psychological
payoff than the equal one, and he is willing to when his message is less likely to be be-
lieved than disbelieved, provided the equal outcome gives him a greater psychological
payoff than the unequal one.⁷
[No social preference lie threshold (a) depends on beliefs (b) can explain discrepancy
b/w prom/pron]
2.3.2.3 Guilt Aversion
Another theory that has been used to explain lying aversion is Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg’s (2007) theory of guilt aversion (e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli
et al., 2013). Under this theory, Senders feel a guilt cost that is proportional to the amount
by which they cause Receivers not to meet their expected payoff. Formally:
uS = S   maxf0;E[R]  Rg (2.2)
where uS is the Sender’s utility, S is his monetary payoff, R is the Receiver’s monetary
payoff, and  is her first-order belief.
Similarly to social preferences, guilt aversion produces a lying condition that does not
depend on second-order beliefs or the scenario being played.
⁷The latter case can be considered an example of “white lie,” as defined by Erat and Gneezy (2012). As
stated in Subsection 2.2.2, they find evidence of aversion to telling even these lies.
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Proof. The Sender’s expected payoff from lying is 10(1   ) + (15   10), and his
expected payoff from telling the truth is 10 + (15  10(1  ))(1  ). Simple algebra
shows that the former is greater than or equal to the latter iff   1
2
.
2.3.3 Equilibrium with Intentional Lying Costs
In the preceding section, we analyzed lying incentives in our game under various theories
of lying aversion. In this section, we assume intentional lying costs and examine the
equilibria that arise.
2.3.3.1 Common Knowledge of Lying Costs
We begin by assuming common knowledge of lying costs.⁸ This is a very strong epistemic
assumption, since there is no reason why a Receiver should know an anonymous Sender’s
lying costs, but it provides a stark, useful benchmark.
In this case, as long as c < 5, the Sender prefers outcomes where the Receiver mis-
matches the states to ones where she matches it. Therefore this game has the same equi-
libria as the game without lying costs, as outlined in Proposition 15. However, if c > 5,
then the Sender would rather tell the truth and have the Receiver match the state than
tell a lie and have the Receiver mismatch the state; therefore, the Sender always tells the
truth.
⁸In other words, we assume that the distribution of lying costs is degenerate. We examine a specific
non-degenerate distribution of lying costs in the following section.
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2.3.3.2 Ethical and Economic Types
Degenerate lying cost distributions provide very stark equilibrium results; lying costs are
either too small to be relevant or so large that they cause Senders to always be honest.
While small lying costs allow for some heterogeneity in observed behavior — Senders
randomize between lying and not lying — they do not, for instance, allow for Senders
who always lie.
To that end, in this sub-subsectionwe derive equilibrium results for amodel of the kind
suggested by Hurkens and Kartik (2009), where there are two types of Senders: “ethical”
types, with infinite lying costs, and “economic” types, with zero lying costs. We show
that the ethical types, who never lie, can in a sense provide cover for the economic types
to lie.
Since our game is symmetric, we are interested in equilibria with a symmetric struc-
ture. We define a symmetric PBE of this game to have the following characteristics:
•  := Pr(`jm) = Pr(rjm) (The Receiver is equally likely to follow a Right message
as a Left message.)
• Pr(j) = Pr(j) = 1
2
(The Sender is equally likely to choose Left or Right in the
Promises scenario.)
•  := Pr(mj; c = 0) = Pr(mj; c = 0) (Economic types are equally likely to tell
truth if the state is Left or if it is Right.)
Proposition 19. Let  = Pr(c =1), i.e. the proportion of ethical types. If   1
2
, then there
is a symmetric PBE where  = 1 and  = 0. If   1
2




and  = 1 2
2 2 .
Proof. First, note that an ethical type in never willing to lie. An economic type, on the
other hand, is willing to lie as long as his expected payoff from doing so is at least as large
as his expected payoff from telling the truth. Put differently, they are willing to lie as long
as 15 + 10(1  )  10 + 15(1  ), which holds iff   1
2
.
The Receiver is willing to follow the Sender’s message as long as their expected payoff
from doing so is at least as great as their expected payoff from doing the opposite of what
the message suggests. Put differently, she is willing to follow the message as long as
10 + 10(1  )  10(1  )(1  ) (since ethical types never lie), which holds iff:
   +   1
2
(2.3)
(2.3) holds 8 2 [0; 1], as long as   1
2
. In other words, a Receiver always follows the
Sender’s message if a Sender is at least as likely to be ethical as economic. Knowing that
his message will be followed, an economic type can maximize his expected payoff with
 = 0.
If   1
2
, then (2.3) does not hold for all  and in particular not for  = 0 (except when
 = 1
2
), so if economic types always lie, then the Receiver will never follow messages.
Therefore, economic types must tell the truth at least some of the time. In order for
economic types to be indifferent between lying and not lying, we must have  = 1
2
. And
in order for the Receiver to be indifferent between following and not following a message,
we need (2.3) to hold with equality, i.e.  = 1 2
2 2 .
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If there are enough ethical types in the population, then their existence lowers the
probability of a Receiver being lied to enough so that economic types can lie with the
knowledge that a Receiver will have enough confidence in their messages to follow them.
In this manner, ethical types provide cover for economic types to lie.
It is also worth noting that since Receivers do not observe the scenario being played,
this theory does not predict how lying behavior depends on the scenario being played
when  < 1
2
. While lying equally often under either scenario can be part of an equilibrium,
it is also possible, for instance, for the Sender to always lie in Pronouncements scenario
and tell the truth with probability 1 2
1  in the Promises scenario. Therefore, observed
differences in lying behavior between the two scenarios are neither ruled in nor ruled out
by a theory of intentional lying costs.
2.3.4 An Alternative Game
As written, in the Promises scenario () of our game, the Sender chooses the state before
sending a message. This facilitates comparison of behavior with the Pronouncements sce-
nario (). However, one typically thinks of promises are being statements of commitment
to a certain action, not statements about a previously chosen action.
For that reason, we also consider a version of our gamewhere the order ofmessage and
state choice is flipped in the Promises scenario. (The Receiver continues not to observe
the choice of state.) It is obvious that this does not affect equilibrium behavior, nor does
it affect the behavior predicted by the aforementioned theories of lying aversion. This is
because both in our original game and our alternative game, the Sender’s decisions in the
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Promises scenario could be collapsed into a single decision; in either case, the Receiver
observes nothing until both decisions have been made.
2.4 Experimental Design
The experimental sessions were conducted at the Columbia Experimental Laboratory for
the Social Sciences (CELSS), using the popular z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Sub-
jects were placed at individual carrels with computer terminals whose monitors were
covered by tinted glass and a shade so that subjects could not easily see each other’s
screens. Participants were recruited through CELSS’s common subject pool, which con-
sists of Columbia University students and alumni,⁹ via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We ran 4
sessions of the baseline game and 2 sessions of the alternative game.
Our experiment used a within-subjects design. Subjects played the game described in
the preceding sections over the course of 4 stages.¹⁰ That is to say, each subject played
the game four times. Each subject was randomly matched with another at the start of the
experiment and was then randomly rematched between each stage. At the start of the
first stage, one subject in each pair was assigned the role of Sender, and the other was
assigned the role of Receiver. Each subject retained the same role for the first two stages
(“Round 1”) and then switched to the other role for the final two stages (“Round 2”). If a
subject played Scenario 1 (Promises) in the first (third) stage, then shewould play Scenario
⁹The subject pool is primarily undergraduate, but also has a significant number of graduate students.
The number of alumni in the pool is negligible.
¹⁰The use of the term “stage” instead of the usual “round” here is deliberate. In our experimental in-
structions, the first two and last two “stages” each composed a “round,” for a total of 4 stages and 2 rounds.
We used the term “round” in this manner to make the rematching procedure clearer to the subjects.
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2 (Pronouncements) in the second (fourth) stage, and vice versa. This ensured that each
subject played both scenarios in both roles over the course of the experiment. When in
the Sender role, subjects were informed of the order in which the scenarios would be
played; when in the Receiver role, subjects were not informed of this order and were told
that both orders were equally probable.
The messages that Senders could transmit to Receivers were fixed. They were ”Going
Left is in your best interests.” and ”Going Right is in your best interests.” These messages
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Figure 2.4: The rematching procedure
Prior to the four iterations of the game, subjects were given a brief questionnaire to
test their understanding of the rules. After the four iterations of the game, the subjects’
first-order and second-order beliefs about whether following the Sender’s message would
be in the Receiver’s best interests when amessage was sent or was not sent were elicited.¹¹
¹¹Specifically, when eliciting first-order beliefs, subjects were told how many interactions there were
between subjects in the session. They were then asked to guess in how many of those interactions listening
to the Sender’s message was in the Receiver’s best interests. When eliciting second-order beliefs, subjects
were asked in how many interactions the Receiver thought that following the Sender’s message was in her
best interests.
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Subjects were also asked a question to test if they truly understood that these beliefs could
not shift between the two scenarios. Finally, subjects were given a brief demographic
questionnaire asking about age, gender, and education.
One of the first two stages and one of the last two stages were randomly selected
for payment, each at a rate of 2 points to $1 US. So as not to blunt incentives, the same
stages were selected for every subject. To incentivize belief elicitation, one of the two
belief elicitation questions was also randomly selected for payment. If a subject’s stated
beliefs were within 20% of the correct value for that question,¹² then she could earn an
additional $2. Subjects also earned a show-up fee of $5. Total earnings for each subject
were rounded up to the nearest dollar to facilitate payment.
2.5 Results
Subsection 2.5.1 presents basic demographic data from the experiment. Subsection 2.5.2
analyzes the behavior of Receivers (subjects in the role of Individual B), and subsection
2.5.3 analyzes the behavior of Senders (subjects in the role of Individual A).
2.5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 lists basic demographic data for the subjects. The pool is fairly gender-
balanced;¹³ the null of perfect gender balance cannot be rejected (two-sided test of pro-
¹²For the first-order belief question, answers were compared to the proportion of interactions in which
the state matched the Sender’s message. For the second-order belief question, answers were compared to
the proportion of interactions in which the Receiver’s choice matched the Sender’s message.
¹³Subjects were given the option to list their gender as “Other / Non-binary”; no subjects used this
option.
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Table 2.1: Laboratory Demographics
Number of subjects n = 108
Gender Male: 52:8%; Female: 47:2%
Age (years) Average: 23.3; St. Dev.: 4.64
Highest level of education achieved
Some post-secondary 52:8%
Completed bachelor’s degree 13:0%
Completed graduate or professional degree 34:3%
Primary area of study is economics 14:8%
portions, p = 0:630). The pool is also highly-educated; nearly half of the subjects have a
post-secondary degree. Also note that most subjects are not economics majors.
Since there there were 108 subjects, each subject played the game four times, and the
game is played in pairs, there were 216 interactions between subjects in this experiment.
2.5.2 Receiver Behavior
In 75.0% (162/216) of interactions between subjects, Receivers followed Senders’ messages.
In other words, in 75.0% of interactions, the Receiver’s action matched the Sender’s mes-
sage.
This is driven primarily by subjects who follow the Sender’s message in both their
interactions as Receivers: 64.8% (70/108) of Receivers follow the Sender’s message twice.
20.4% (22/108) of Receivers follow the Sender’s message only once, and 14.8% (16/108) of
Receivers never follow the Sender’s message. As shown by Proposition 15, the PBE of
the game without lying costs or social preferences predicts that Receivers follow Senders’
messages half the time, which means that 25% of Receivers should follow both messages,
50% should follow one message, and 25% should follow no message. A chi-squared test
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rejects this hypothesis (2 = 91:9, p < 0:001).
Themean first-order belief (i.e. the Receiver’s belief that the Sender is telling the truth)
is 55.3%, and the standard deviation is 19.7%. The PBE would predict a first-order belief
of 50%, and the data reject this (two-sided Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0:0053). Figure 2.5
shows a histogram of first-order beliefs. Note that the distribution appears bimodal, with
one mode around 0.5, and another between 0.7 and 0.8; indeed, a dip test (Hartigan and
Hartigan, 1985) rejects the null of unimodality (D = 0:052, p = 0:029).
Figure 2.5: Histogram of first-order beliefs
Table 2.2 shows the results of a multinomial regression of belief data and demographic
covariates on the categorization of Receivers by often they followed the Sender’s message,
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with no trust as the baseline category. Demographic variables have no significant effect
on trusting behavior. Curiously, Receivers with higher second-order beliefs are more
likely to trust both Senders’ messages; those who believe others are credulous are more
trusting. However, this effect is not highly significant.
Table 2.2: Categorization of Receivers
Trust Once Trust Twice
1st-order belief 2.326 3.455
(2.723) (2.468)








Sender first 0.559 0.088
(0.734) (0.662)




Akaike Inf. Crit. 194.066 194.066




We now turn our attention to Sender behavior. Senders lie in 31.0% (67/216) of interac-
tions, which means that they lie significantly less than Receivers believe.
This honesty is driven by the 60.2% (65/108) of Senders who never lie. 17.6% (19/108)
lie once, and 22.2% (24/108) lie twice. As shown by Proposition 15, the PBE of the game
without lying costs or social preferences predicts that Senders lie half the time, which
means that 25% of them should never lie, 50% of them should lie once, and 25% of them
should lie twice. A chi-squared test rejects this hypothesis (2 = 78:5, p < 0:001).
To further subcategorize the Senders who lie once, 47.4% (9/19) lie only in the Promises
scenario, and 52.6% (10/19) lie only in the Pronouncements scenario. This is statistically
indistinguishable from the Senders who lie once being equally likely to lie in either sce-
nario (one-sided test of proportions, p = 1:000).
The mean second-order belief (i.e. the Sender’s belief about the Receiver’s belief that
the Sender is telling the truth) is 55:4%, and the standard deviation is 21.3%. The PBE
would predict that this belief would be 50%, but the data reject this (two-sided Mann-
Whitney U test, p = 0:0048). Figure 2.6 shows a histogram of first-order beliefs. Note
that the distribution appears bimodal, with one mode around 0.5, and another between
0.7 and 0.8; indeed, a dip test (Hartigan and Hartigan, 1985) rejects the null of unimodality
(D = 0:067, p < 0:001). The correlation between first- and second-order beliefs is 0.710,
which indicates that the credulous tend to believe others are credulous.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 display multinomial regressions showing how the categorization
of Senders by how often they lie depends on beliefs, experimental variables, and demo-
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Table 2.3: Categorization of Senders (1)
Lie Once Lie Twice
1st-order belief 0.263  7.650
(1.997) (2.293)








Sender first  0.058  1.142
(0.560) (0.598)
Promises first as sender  0.513  0.262
(0.542) (0.532)




Akaike Inf. Crit. 217.509 217.509
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Baseline: Lie Never
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Table 2.4: Categorization of Senders (2)
Lie Only Pronouncements Lie Only Promises Lie Twice
1st-order belief 2.513  2.715  7.853
(2.608) (3.055) (2.325)
2nd-order belief  1.897 3.143 4.086
(2.506) (2.766) (1.920)
Female  0.217 0.922  0.055
(0.748) (0.849) (0.558)
Economics major  14.581 1.092 1.035
(0.00001) (1.048) (0.794)
Age 0.133  0.054  0.074
(0.072) (0.103) (0.072)
Sender first  0.551 0.352  1.157
(0.774) (0.817) (0.599)
Promises first as sender  0.886  0.231  0.248
(0.754) (0.742) (0.533)
Alternative treatment 0.452 0.882  0.785
(0.837) (0.800) (0.703)
Constant  4.756  2.144 3.235
(2.315) (3.118) (2.124)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 250.189 250.189 250.189
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Baseline: Lie Never
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Figure 2.6: Histogram of first-order beliefs
graphic covariates, with the latter table splitting those who lie once by the scenario in
which they lie. Experimental variables — namely playing in the Sender role before the
Receiver role, playing the Promises scenario first as the Sender, and playing the alter-
native game — do not have a significant effect on this categorization. For the most part,
demographic covariates do not either, but being an economicsmajor reduces the chance of
lying only in the pronouncements scenario significantly relative to the baseline of never
lying. Most interesting, however, is the dependence of lying categorization on beliefs.
All else being equal, there is no significant difference in beliefs between the Senders who
never lie and those who lie once. However, those with lower first-order beliefs and higher
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second-order beliefs are more likely to lie twice. In other words, the less credulous are
more likely to lie twice, and those who believe others are more credulous are also more
likely to lie twice.
Given this evidence on beliefs, we classify subjects according to whether their first-
order belief was strictly less than their second-order belief or not (i.e. whether or not they
were strictly less credulous than they believed others to be). Using a one-sided Fisher’s
exact test, we find that people with higher second- than first-order beliefs are more likely
to lie twice than those who do not hold such beliefs (p < 0:001). (The relevant two-way
contingency table is Table 2.5.)
Table 2.5: Two-way contingency table for lying and beliefs
Lie Once or Less Lie Both
1st-order Belief Weakly Greater 67 10
1st-order Belief Strictly Less 17 14
Table 2.6 displays a linear regression of Sender behavior on beliefs, demographic co-
variates, and experimental variables. Each interaction is an observation, and the depen-
dent variable is whether the Sender lied in that interaction. The main variable of interest,
an indicator for the Pronouncements scenario, does not have a significant effect on the
Sender’s behavior. It also does not have a significant effect when interacted with an indi-
cator for playing the alternative game. As in the previous regressions in this subsection,
the primary driver of lying is the first-order belief; those who are less credulous are more
likely to lie.
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Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the subject level.
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
From the results, it is evident that the degree of control over the final outcome of an
interaction is not a major determinant of lying behavior; broken promises are no more
or less likely than false pronouncements. These results stand in contrast with Vanberg’s
(2008) results, which find that the propensity to follow through on a commitment depends
heavily on being responsible for having made said commitment. This suggests that some
nuance is required when discussion lying aversion: control over final outcomes does not
affect the aversion to lying; however, control over communication affects the aversion to
breaking commitments.
In contrast to Sheremeta and Shields (2013), we find beliefs to be a significant fac-
tor in determining lying behavior. We find that higher first-order beliefs imply a lower
probability of lying, and higher second-order beliefs imply a higher probability of lying.
In other words, the less credulous people are and the more they believe others are cred-
ulous, the more likely they are to lie. Arguably, this implies that cynics — people who
believe others are gullible but not trustworthy — are most likely to lie. Future research
should examine the extent to which beliefs and lying behavior are correlated with the
“Big Five” personality factors (cf. Goldberg and Saucier, 1996), such as conscientiousness
and agreeableness, in order to study this hypothesis further.¹⁴
Previous studies in lying aversion have presented evidence consistent with a two-type
model in which there are some people who will lie when it is in their monetary self-
¹⁴Some personality research has shown evidence consistent with a six-factor model, in which hon-
esty/humility is one factor (Ashton et al., 2004). Presumably, lying behavior would be highly correlated
with such a factor.
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interest and others who will never lie (e.g. Hurkens and Kartik, 2009). The small number
of Senders who lie only once (as compared to equilibrium predictions) provides some
evidence consistent with this. However, subjects’ beliefs paint a slightly more nuanced
picture. First-order and second-order beliefs are strongly positively correlated; however,
of the subjects who lie twice, more have higher second-order beliefs than first-order be-
liefs than do not. This indicates that there is heterogeneity of beliefs within classifications
of lying and non-lying types.
Overall, we find responsibility for a final outcome not to be a major driver of lying
behavior. This suggests that putting spokespeople in supervisory roles or putting super-
visors in communicational roles is of limited usefulness; they are no more or less likely to
lie about a project under their control. What may reduce lying in organizations, however,
is putting less cynical people in charge of communication.
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Chapter 3
Costly Information and Multiattribute Choice
3.1 Introduction
Many of the goods that people purchase have multiple attributes that consumers may
care about. For instance, when purchasing a laptop computer, one may be interested in
its hard drive space, its processor clock speed, its maximum screen resolution, and its
battery life, among other features. Some features of the laptop may draw a consumer’s
attention more than others. This may be because some features will have more impact on
the usefulness of the laptop to the consumer than others. For example, if the consumer
travels a lot, then she may care a great deal about the computer’s battery life.
However, the consumer’s attention may be drawn to specific features not because
of the direct impact on the utility she draws from them, but because of aspects of her
decision environment. Here are two examples: 1) If the laptops available for sale vary
greatly in their maximum screen resolution, then she may want to pay special attention
to this attribute, because a laptop with the wrong maximum screen resolution may have a
very different maximum screen resolution from what she desires. 2) If one of the laptops
for sale has three times more hard drive space than any of the others, then her attention
may be drawn to that attribute of that particular laptop, since it “stands out” relative to
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the others.
The first example is an example of a focusing illusion, modeled by Kőszegi and Szeidl
(2013) (henceforth KS), and the second is an example of salience, modeled by Bordalo et al.
(2013) (henceforth BGS). Both of these papers assume context-dependent distortions on
the evaluation of multiattribute options and derive implications therefrom.¹ However,
while these distortions have compelling and justifiable properties, a question remains as
two whether these distortions reflect an efficient use of cognitive resources, i.e. whether
they are “optimal” relative to some maximization problem.
There is reason to believe that people make rational trade-offs when acquiring infor-
mation about their decision environments. More information can help people make better
decisions, but it can also be costly to obtain. Caplin and Dean (2014) document laboratory
evidence consistent with such trade-offs in a ball-counting task. There is also empirical
evidence that people engage in such trade-offs when making real-life purchases of the
kind relevant to the present paper. For instance, De los Santos et al. (2012) document
that people only visit a small number of online retailers before making book purchases,
despite the fact that there are many online book sellers. This finding could reflect the fact
that while searching through a large number of stores could help consumers get better
deals, doing so is time consuming and takes a great deal of effort. To cite another example,
Chetty et al. (2009) find that consumers do not fully account for sales taxes when making
purchasing decisions.
Given that trade-offs between the costs and benefits of acquiring information may be
¹There is a growing body of literature on the evaluation of multiattribute options. See also, for example,
Bordalo et al. (2012), Soltani et al. (2012), Cunningham (2013), and Bushong et al. (2016).
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a feature of many decision environments, including consumer-relevant ones, it is worth
exploring what these models of “rational inattention” imply in a multiattribute choice
context. Some work has already been done in this direction. Woodford (2012) has pro-
vided an information-theoretic explanation for focusing illusions using a variant of Sims’s
(2003) theory of rational inattention, and though it is not technically an optimzing founda-
tion, Landry and Webb (2017) have provided a neuroscientific foundation for the salience
model based on how the brain processes visual information. To the extent that the brain
processes information efficiently, this could provide a basis for an optimizing framework.
The present paper provides a unified, optimizing, information-theoretic framework
under which either focusing illusions or salience-like distortions can present themselves,
depending on what information the decision-maker observes. Section 3.2 presents the
model. Section 3.3 explains focusing illusions in greater detail and demonstrates how
the framework can account for them. Section 3.4 does the same for salience distortions.
Section 3.5 concludes. Proofs are appendicized.
3.2 The Model
Suppose the decision-maker (DM) must evaluate I options, or items, (i = 1; : : : ; I), each
with J attributes (j = 1; : : : ; J ). Let ai;j be the value of the j-th attribute of the i-th item,
letA be the IJ matrix of item-attribute pair values, and let ~ai := (ai;j)Jj=1 be the vector
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of attribute values for item i. The DM’s utility from selecting item i is:²




The DM has a continuous, non-atomic prior over each item-attribute pair with cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) Fi;j and associated density fi;j , with full support on the
real line. Assume that each Fi;j has a finite second moment. Each item-attribute pair is
independently distributed from any other item-attribute pair, and 8 j, fi;j = fk;j . Put
differently, the same attribute is independently and identically distributed across items,
and within an item, each attribute is independently (but not necessarily identically) dis-
tributed. Let f denote the joint density of all item-attribute pairs, and let fi denote the
joint density of all attributes within an item.
TheDMwishes to learn the value of each ui byminimizing the the mean squared error
(MSE) E[(ui  u^i)2], where u^i denotes her prediction of ui.³ Since item-attribute pairs are
independent, this is equivalent to minimizing the sum of mean squared errors:
JX
j=1
E[(ai;j   a^i;j)2] (3.2)
where a^i;j denotes her prediction of ai;j . She does so by choosing probabilistic subjective
²It is a fairly strong assumption that utility is additively separable in attribute values. However, lin-
earity is not a strong assumption, since as long as utility is monotonically increasing in each attribute and
additively separable, then one could simply apply a transformation to the underlying attribute values to
make utility linear in the transformed values. Moreover, the lack of attribute weights is also not a restric-
tive assumption, since attribute values can simply be rescaled multiplicatively. For a further discussion of
these points, see Subsection 2.1 of Woodford (2012).
³The importance of evaluating each item separately will become clear in Section 3.4 when discussing
salience.
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representations ri;j of these values, distributed according to the joint density gi(~rij~ai),
where ~r = ((ri;j)Jj=1. This incurs a cost C(fi; gi) given by a multiplicative scaling of the
mutual information (cf. Cover and Thomas, 2006) between f and g:












































where gi;j is the density distribution of the probabilistic subjective representation ri;j .
Mutual information measures the expected reduction in entropy going from the prior
distribution to the posterior, and it can be thought of as how much of the uncertainty in
the prior is explained by the posterior. It is intuitive that the more one wishes to learn
about an attribute value, the more effort is required, and so the greater the cost incurred.
Assume that the cost enters the DM’s objective function additively, so that she must
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choose gi to minimize:
E[(ui   u^i)2] + C(fi; gi) (3.5)






i.e. the posterior density of the value of ai;j given ri;j . The MSE is minimized by selecting





Since the posterior mean minimizes the MSE, the optimal MSE is actually the posterior
variance of u^i, which by independence across attributes, is the sum of the posterior vari-
ances of a^i;j .
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to have a quantitative definition for the





to be the amount of attention paid to attribute j of item i, where 2q is the variance of the
distribution with density q. In other words, I define the amount of attention paid to an
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item-attribute pair to be proportional reduction in variance from observing its subjective




, attention takes values between 0 and 1, where
0 implies no attention was paid to an attribute — the posterior variance is the same as
the prior variance — and 1 implies full attention was paid — the posterior variance is 0,
implying a 1-to-1 deterministic mapping between the subjective representation and the
true attribute value. It is easy to see that i;j decreases in the posterior variance (i.e.
increases in the posterior precision); the more the DM decreases the spread of her belief,
the more attention she pays.
3.3 Focusing
3.3.1 The KS Model
I begin this section by presenting a brief overview of KS’s model of focusing effects. They










where j is increasing in its argument, and j(A) := maxj ai;j   minj ai;j is the range
of attribute j. Therefore, when evaluating options, the DM puts greater emphasis on
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attributes with a wider range, i.e. those that vary more.
3.3.2 Focusing in a Probabilistic Model
Sincemymodel is probabilistic, instead of using the range of an attribute within the choice
set as a measure of how much an attribute varies, I use the variance.⁴ In this subsection,
I show that the attention paid to an attribute of an item is weakly increasing in the prior
variance.
Proposition 20. Let and  denote the CDF and density of the standard normal distribution.










, whichever has lower variance.
A version of this result was stated but not proven by Sims (2003). It may seem remark-
able that the optimal posterior is normally distributed regardless of the prior (provided
the prior has full support on the real line), but this is not surprising in light of Caplin and
Dean’s (2013) “locally invariant posteriors” result, which shows in a discrete setting that
if a set of posteriors is optimal for some prior, if it is feasible for another prior, then it is
optimal for that prior. Proposition 20 can be seen as a continuous version of that result
for a specific utility function.
Corollary 1. Attention paid to an attribute increases in the prior variance.





	. This implies that either
posterior variance is fixed, given prior variance, or no attention is paid if the prior variance
⁴The range of the attribute distribution’s support is not an appropriate measure, because it is infinite.
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, which is clearly
increasing in the prior variance.
If the priors are normally distributed, then there is a closed form for the posterior
mean of h.




.⁵ Then the optimal prediction for








When priors are normally distributed, the optimal prediction is a weighted average
of the subjective representation ri;j and prior mean j . The weight on the former is in-
creasing in the prior variance 2j , and the weight on the latter is decreasing in the prior
variance.





where ~(x) := 2x 
2x
. The weights ~(2j ) in (3.11) have a similar property to the weights
j(j(A)) in (3.10). Those in the former are increasing in the prior variance of each
attribute, while those in the latter are increasing in the range of each attribute. In this
instance, in my model, not only is the attention paid to each attribute increasing in the
prior variance, but a focusing effect similar to the one presented by KS also obtains.
⁵This inequality ensures that the optimal posterior is not simply the prior.
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3.4 Salience
3.4.1 The BGS Model
I begin this section by presenting a brief overview of BGS’s model of salience distortions.










The weights !i;j reflect how much ai;j differs from its mean value in the choice set aj .
They are computed as follows. Consider a symmetric, continuous salience function s(; )
with the following two properties:
1. Ordering. Let ;   0 with at least one strictly positive. If ai;j > aj , then s(ai;j +
; aj   ) > s(ai;j; aj). If ai;j < aj , then s(ai;j   ; aj + ) > s(ai;j; aj).
2. Diminishing Sensitivity. Let ai;j; aj  0 and  > 0.⁷ Then, s(ai;j + ; aj + ) >
s(ai;j; aj).
⁶Given that BGS’s model is applied specifically to consumer choice, it also includes a price component
that is subtracted away from the sum of attribute values. For the sake of compatibility with the present
paper, I ignore it here. Bordalo et al. (2012) presents a version of their model applied to choice under risk
that does not include a price component, but does include utility weights.
⁷BGS only consider positive attribute values. They allow for negative attribute values in Bordalo et al.
(2012) when analyzing choice under risk and impose an additional requirement on the salience function
called reflection. My model will allow for negative attribute values.
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The salience function measures how much an attribute of an item “stands out” rela-
tive to its mean in the choice set. The ordering property implies that the further away an
attribute value is from its mean, the more salient it is. The diminishing sensitivity prop-
erty implies that increasing attribute values uniformly in the choice set diminishes their
salience.
After computing the salience s(ai;j; aj) for each item-attribute pair, the attributes of
each item are ranked by salience and given a rank i;j , with the highest receiving a rank






where  2 (0; 1).
In this model, the attributes that “stand out” compared to other attributes for a given
item are given more weight when evaluating that item. This reflects the idea that at-
tributes of an item that are irregular or atypical in some way may draw a consumer’s
attention more than others.
3.4.2 Salience in a Probabilistic Model
Mymodel can account for some features of the BGS model, but will have a few important
differences. It will allow for multiple attributes to be “salient” for a given item. In fact, in
the example I present, salience will be a binary property; an item-attribute pair is either
salient or not.
Before proceeding further, a discussion of the crucial assumption that will lead to
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salience effects is in order. It has long been observed in perceptual psychology that com-
parative judgements are easier to make than absolute ones (e.g. Fernberger, 1931; Miller,
1956). For example, in an experiment by Fernberger (1931), subjects did worse at classi-
fying a series of weights as “light,” “intermediate,” or “heavy” than they did at classifying
those weights as “lighter,” “equal to,” or “heavier” than a reference weight.
In this section, we make the extreme assumption that comparative judgements can
be made for free, but absolute judgements are costly. Suppose that the DM can observe
the ranking of each item-attribute pair across items at zero cost. In other words, before
making her information-acquisition decision, the DM observes, for each j, ad 1j (1);j <
: : : < ad 1j (I);j , where dj is a permutation that ranks items from smallest to largest, from
1 to I , on attribute j.⁸ Let ~fi;j(ai;j) := fi;j

ai;j
ad 1j (1);j < : : : < ad 1j (I);j be the prior
density of attribute value (i; j) conditional on the ranking.
It can be shown that attribute values are not necessarily independent across items
conditional on this ranking information. This is where the assumption that the evalua-
tion of each item is a separate decision problem becomes crucial. This means that the DM
cannot use the information from the evaluation of one item in the evaluation of another.
Moreover, the attribute values of a given item are still independent across attributes, con-
ditional on rankings. These facts allows me to apply Proposition 20 and Corollary 1 in
this context.
For the sake of illustration, I present an example. Suppose that I = 3, so that there
are only 3 items and that the attribute values are independently distributed according to
⁸Since fi;j are independent and atomless, two items sharing the same value for a given attribute is a








, before the ranking is observed.
Proposition 22. In this context, with 3 items, more attention is paid to the highest- and
lowest-ranked attribute values for a given attribute than to the middle-ranked one. If it is
further assumed that j =  for all j, then for a given item, more attention is paid to an
attribute value ranked highest or lowest than to an attribute value that is middle-ranked.
Let VE;j be the variance of an extreme-ranked attribute value for attribute j,⁹ and let
VM;j be the variance of a middle-ranked attribute value for attribute j. It can be shown














, and VM;j < VE;j . By Corollary 1, this
implies that more attention should be paid to extreme attribute values thanmiddle-ranked
ones. Furthermore, if the attributes are a priori identically distributed, then VE;j and VM;j
are fixed across j, and the second part of Proposition 22 obtains.
Asmentioned earlier, in contrast to the BGSmodel, this framework allows for multiple
attributes to be equally salient for each item. In fact, in the three-item case, attributes are
either salient or not. Attribute values that are highest- or lowest-ranked for a given item
are salient, and those that are middle-ranked are not. This presents an advantage over the
BGS model in that it allows for different items in a choice set to draw different amounts
attention from the DM. Items with a lot of extreme attribute values will draw the DM’s
attention more than items with mostly moderate attribute values.
To return to the laptop example of the introduction, a budget laptops that has the
lowest value on many of its attributes or an enthusiast laptop that has the highest value
on many of its attributes may draw a consumer’s attention more than a mid-range laptop
⁹The variances of the highest- and lowest-ranked values for a given attribute are the same, by the
symmetry of the normal distribution.
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that is not particularly remarkable on most of its dimensions. However, if, for instance,
the mid-range laptop has the best battery life, then more attention will be drawn that
attribute of that laptop as compared to that attribute of other laptops.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature on context effects and multi-
attribute choice by providing an information-theoretic foundation for some of the phe-
nomena the literature documents, namely focusing illusions (KS) and salience distortions
(BGS).
Several potential avenues for future research present themselves. Most immediate is
determining whether the salience effects obtained in this information-theoretic frame-
work generalize to larger choice sets and other priors; the documented effects may be in
part due to the assumption of normality.
Secondly, it is worth noting that Bushong et al. (2016) have analyzed a model with the
opposite assumption of KS. In their “relative thinking” model, the weighting function j
is a decreasing function of an attribute’s range. It would be worth exploring whether such
a distortion can be rationalized in this information-theoretic framework, using perhaps a
different cost funtion or different assumptions on free information.
Finally, and relatedly, there is evidence to suggest that mutual information does not
accurately reflect the costs of information acquisition (Caplin and Dean, 2013). Different
functional forms for the cost function may lead to different types of distortions in multiat-
tribute choice and could potentially explain “relative thinking,” among other phenomena.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Chapter 1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The ‘if’ direction is obvious, since our model generalizes CD15 with finite action
sets.
The ‘only if’ direction can be seen as follows. Suppose f(Ui; i; ai)g can be rationalized
by (1.2) with some cost functionC(;Q). Since there are finitely many decision problems,
C is pinned down for a finite set of points (i.e. a closed set), and so by the Tietze extension
theorem (cf. Rudin, 1974, pg. 422), it may be assumed continuous. Define QQ to be set
of information structures that induce posterior Q, and define ~C(;Q) := min
R2QQ
C(;R),
assuming it is well-defined. Q always induces the samemaximum gross payoff, nomatter
which information structure in QQ generated it. Therefore, since the DM is a payoff
maximizer, for each distribution of posteriors she generates, she will always select the
lowest-cost method of doing so. This implies that behavior that can be rationalized by C
can also be rationalized by ~C , which obviously satisfies cost equivalence.
Now we must verify that ~C is actually well-defined. Let b : Q  ! (()) be the
function that maps an information structure to the distribution of posteriors it induces.
First, we must show that b is continuous when (()) is equipped with the weak-
topology, i.e. the topology of weak convergence of measure.






k 2 f1; : : : jM jg;Pnl=1 lql;k > 0o,
and each element  2 Supp(b(Q)) is induced with probabilityPk2Q Pnl=1 lql;k, where
Q is the set of columns of Q that generate the posterior  .
Consider a sequence of information structures Q1; Q2; : : : 2 Q converging to Q. We
must show that lim
j!1
b(Qj) = b(Q) (in the sense of weak convergence of measure). By
Theorem 25.8 of Billingsley (1995), this is equivalent to showing that lim
j!1
b(Qj)(X) =
b(Q)(X) for all continuity sets X in the Borel -algebra of ().¹⁰
Since X is a continuity set, @X \ Supp(b(Q)) = ;. There are two cases. Either
X \ Supp(b(Q)) = ; or int(X) \ Supp(b(Q)) 6= ;.
Case 1: X \ Supp(b(Q)) = ;. If 9 J 2 N such that b(Qj)(X) = 0 8 j > J , then
clearly lim
j!1
b(Qj)(X) = b(Q)(X) = 0. If not, then 8 J 2 N; 9 j > J such that
X \ Supp(b(Qj)) 6= ;. Suppose, for a contradiction, that lim
j!1
b(Qj)(X) 6= 0. Then
¹⁰A continuity set is a set X whose boundary @X has measure zero.
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9 " > 0 such that 8 J 2 N; 9 j > J such that b(Qj)(X) > ". Therefore, there must








converges in cl(X) for some k.¹¹
If it converges to a point in int(X), then this contradicts the fact that b(Q)(X) = 0. If
it converges to a point in @X , then b(Q)(@X) > 0, contradicting the fact that X is a
continuity set. Thus, lim
j!1
b(Qj)(X) = b(Q)(X).
Case 2: int(X) \ Supp(b(Q)) 6= ;. Note that since (Qj) is a convergent sequence,
each entry of the matrices in (Qj) also defines a convergent sequence. Then each
((zk)j) := ((
Pn








either converges to some limit yk (for zk > 0) or else has an un-
defined limit (when zk = 0).¹² Since they are continuous functions of the entries of 





(when it exists) and zk =Pn
l=1 lql;k, where the entries ql;k are taken from Q. Consider the set K  f1; : : : ;Mg
such that f((yk)j)jk 2 Kg is the collection of sequences that converge to points in int(X).
Then, because int(X) is open, 8 " > 0 and 8 k 2 K; 9Nk such that 8 j > Nk; (yk)j 2
int(X). Let N = max
k2K









l=1 lql;k)j goes to zero as j grows large.
Suppose there does not exist J 2 N such that this sequence has the value 0 8 j > J . Then





0 for all jh. Then for each jh, there is some k0 2K such that (yk0)jh 2 Supp(b(Qjh)).
Because jM j is finite, we may assume that this k0 is fixed. If ((yk0)jh) is convergent, it
must converge in cl(X). If yk0 2 int(X), then this contradicts the fact that k 2K . If
yk0 2 @X , then this contradicts the fact that X is a continuity set. If ((yk0)jh) has no










This establishes the continuity of b. Therefore, for a given  with finite support in
(()), b 1(fg) is closed (since singletons are closed). Because b 1(fg)  Q andQ
is a bounded subset of RnRjM j, then by the Heine-Borel theorem, b 1(fg) is compact.
In particularQQ is compact, and since C is continuous (fixing ), by the Weierstrass
theorem, it attains its minimum onQQ . Therefore, ~C is well-defined. This concludes the
proof.
¹¹We can take k fixed here because even if we construct a subsequence where the sequence of pos-
teriors is constructed by different columns of Qjh for different sequence elements, we can merely take a
subsequence of that subsequence, but with k fixed.
¹²It is possible that (yk)j0 maybe be undefined for some k and j0. This occurs when (zk)j0 = 0. If there
are finitely many such j0, then we can simply consider a sequence (Qj) with these j0 removed. If there
are infinitely many such j0, then (zk)j must converge to zero. Therefore, WLOG, either (Qj) is such that
(zk)j 6= 0 8 j; k and possibly converges to zero, or (zk)j definitely converges to zero.
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Proof of Proposition 3




1 0    0
... . . . . . . ...
1 0    0
37775 (3.15)
where IjAj is the identity matrix of dimension jAjjAj and the lower block of D has
dimension (jM j jAj) jAj.
Given Q 2 Q, select a decision matrix D such that the gross payoff tr(QDU) is
maximized. Since the gross payoff is linear in the entries of D, its entries may be chosen
so that all of its nonzero entries are 1, WLOG. Consider the mapping  : f1; : : : ; jM jg  !
f1; : : : ; jAjg so that (j) is the 1 entry in the j-th row of D. The signal (and associated
posterior) induced by the j-th column of Q result in action a(j) being taken.
Now consider Q0 constructed from Q and  in the following manner. For k 2
f1; : : : ; jAjg, the k-th column of Q0 is Pj2 1(k) q;j , where q;j is the j-th column of
Q and empty sums are taken to be columns of zeroes. For k > jAj, the columns of Q0 are
all zeroes.
(Q;D) and (Q0; D) imply the same Pr(aj) for each a 2 A;  2 , since the (i; j)-th
entry of Q0 D is q0i;j =
P
k2 1(j) qi;k. For j  jAj, q0i;j = Pr(ajji), since under D, action
j is taken only when signal j is received. Furthermore, for j  jAj, Pk2 1(j) qi;k =
Pr(ajji), since under D, action j is taken if and only if a signal in  1(j) is received.
Thus, tr(QDU) = tr(Q0 DU), i.e. the gross payoffs are the same under either (Q;D)
or (Q0; D).
Consider the jM jjM j matrix P with entries pi;j such that pi;(i) = 1 for each i and
all other entries are 0. P takes the i-th column of a matrix and shuffles it to the (i)-
th column. Thus, Q0 = QP . P is right-stochastic since each of its rows has a single 1
entry and zeroes for the rest of its entries. Therefore, by monotonicity of information,
C(;Q0)  C(;Q). Note that Q0 uses as many signals as there are posteriors in its
support, with each posterior inducing a different action. Therefore, given , there is a
one-to-one correspondence between a column of Q0 and the posterior it induces along
with its associated probability. Therefore, the only other matrices that induce the same
distribution of posteriors as Q0 with the same number of signals are permutations of the
columns ofQ0. By cost symmetry, each of these information structures has the same cost
asQ0. Furthermore, as we showed above, given D,Q0 represents the probability of taking
each action in each state. Therefore, the only information structures that induce the same
distribution of actions given states at the same cost as Q0 are permutations of Q0, and
there are no information structures that do so at lower cost.
Thus, WLOG, we can fix D as the decision matrix and simply consider the problem:
max
Q2Q
tr(Q DU)  C(;Q) (3.16)
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Denote the maximand in (3.16) by F (Q). Since F (Q) is continuous in Q and U , and
Q is compact, by the maximum theorem, the optimal choice of information structure for
each payoff matrix, Q(U), is upper hemicontinuous in U .
Since the first term of F (Q) is linear and the second is almost strictly convex, it in-
herits its convexity properties from the second term. In other words, F (Q) is almost
strictly concave, with almost strict concavity defined analogously to almost strict con-
vexity. For each U , eitherQ(U) is unique or it is multivalued. Suppose it is multivalued,
and Q1; Q2 2 Q(U). Then F (Q1) = F (Q2). If Q1 and Q2 induce different distributions
of posteriors, then 8 2 (0; 1); F (Q1+(1 )Q2)  F (Q1)+(1 )F (Q2) = F (Q1),
contradicting the optimality of Q1 and Q2.
Now suppose thatQ1 andQ2 induce the same distribution of posteriors and therefore
induce the same gross payoffs. Then either @ 2 (0; 1) such that F (Q1+ (1  )Q2) =
F (Q1)+ (1 )F (Q2), in which case the argument of the preceding paragraph applies,
or else there does exist such , in which case Q 2 Q(U) as well, and we denote the
corresponding information structure by Q. Then, by the linearity of the trace function
and the fact that Q1 and Q2 induce the same distribution of posteriors, tr(Q DU) =
tr(Q1 DU) = tr(Q2 DU).
This implies that tr(Q(U) DU) is single-valued, and since it is the composition of
a continuous function (which can be viewed as an upper hemicontinuous correspon-
dence) with an upper hemicontinuous correspondence, it is itself upper hemicontinuous
(cf. Theorem 14.1.5 of Sydsæter et al., 2008). Together, its upper hemicontinuity and
single-valuedness imply that it is a continuous function of U , thereby completing the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The continuity of C follows directly from the continuity of each of the functions
ci;j .
The Hessian matrix of C(;Q) is an njM jnjM j matrix with entries @2ci;j(;)
@q2i;j
on the
diagonal and zeroes elsewhere. Since these diagonal entries are all strictly positive, the
Hessian is clearly positive-definite, and we conclude that C is strictly convex for each
.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We begin by proving the “only if” direction. Let r1  r2 be two possible rewards.
Let Qi be the information structure optimally chosen under reward ri, i = 1; 2. Let
Dji be the decision matrix chosen under information structure Qi and reward rj , i; j =
1; 2. Since decisions can be thought of as being made optimally given signals from the
information structure, WLOG, we can take Di := Dii = D:ii , i = 1; 2.
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The NIAC condition gives us:
r1tr(Q1D1) + r2tr(Q2D2)  r2tr(Q1D1) + r1tr(Q2D2)
=) r1P (r1) + r2P (r2)  r2P (r1) + r1P (r2)
=) (r1   r2)[P (r1)  P (r2)]  0 (3.17)
Since r1  r2, in order for (3.17) to hold, we require that P (r1)  P (r2). This proves
the “only if” direction.
For the “if” direction, consider a set of reward levels r1  r2  : : :  rN and associated
performances P1  P2  : : :  PN , where Pi := P (ri). (We can order the performances
in this manner since P  is nondecreasing.)
Consider an assignment of performances to rewards (ri; P1(i))Ni=1, where 1 is a cyclic
permutation. Let 2 be defined as follows:
2(i) :=
8<:
1; i = 1
1(1); i = 1
 1(1)
1(i); otherwise
Nowwe compute the difference in total gross payoffs between the assignments defined

















 0; since r1  r1 1(i) and P1  P1(1)




j; i = j
j(j); i = j
 1(j)
j(i); otherwise
By the preceding argument, the total gross payoffs to the assignment increase (weakly) at
each step. Since there areN rewards, this process must finish inN 1 steps, ending with
N(i) = i and the highest possible gross payoff. Since the initial assignment (ri; P1(i))Ni=1
was arbitrary, this implies the NIAC condition for our data.
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Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Fix some x 2 A and y 2 . Then:
Pr( = xja = x)  Pr( = yja = x)
() rPr( = xja = x) + 0 
X
z 6=x
Pr( = zja = x)
 rPr( = yja = x) + 0 
X
z 6=y




u(x; z) Pr( = zja = x) 
X
z2












Pr(a = xj = z) Pr( = z)

Pr(a = x)
() uk;Qd;k  ul;Qd;k;
where x and y are the k-th and l-th elements of , respectively
The last implication holds because the (i; j)-th entry ofQD is Pr(ajji). Since all these
implications are bidirectional, and x and y were chosen arbitrarily, this completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 8





since Q has finite support. It is clear from (3.18) that the expected posterior entropy
depends only on Q and not the specificQ that induced it. Therefore, I(;Q) = (H() 
E[H(jQ)]) must satisfy cost equivalence.
Consider an information structure Q and a garbling P . Since P is itself a stochastic
matrix,   ! Q  ! QP form aMarkov chain in that order (cf. Cover andThomas, 2006,
Section 2.8). Therefore, by the data processing inequality (cf. Cover and Thomas, 2006,
Theorem 2.8.1), I(;Q)  I(;QP ).
I is a composition of continuous functions and so it is clearly continuous except pos-
sibly when an entry in one of its arguments is zero. However, lim
(x;y)#(0;0)





= 0, so continuity does not fail there either.
Convexity follows from Theorem 2.7.4 of Cover and Thomas (2006).
Finally, symmetry follows from cost equivalence.
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Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Since payoffs are symmetric across states, if the DM is optimizing, then she selects
the most likely state given her posterior beliefs. Therefore, given an information structure







-th entry of d;j is 1 and all other entries are 0. Then, the probability








Now we show that this optimal probability can be achieved using no more than n









and the corresponding maxima are strictly positive. Then, construct Q from Q where
the columns of Q are the columns of Q, except for the j-th and j0-th columns. q;j =
q;j+ q


















i;j0 , and since the rest of the columns of of Q are the same














i;j . Furthermore, this
quantity is unaffected by rearrangements of the columns of Q.
Using this logic, we construct Q0 as follows. For j > n, let q0;j be a column of ze-




) q;k, with an empty sum taken to be














i;j . Therefore, if we con-





































subject to iq0i;i = maxkkq0k;i 8 i  n (3.19)
Since both the ex-ante gross payoff and the cost depend only on the probability of an-
swering correctly. Let this probability be q. Then, the maximand in (3.19) can be rewritten
as rq  K(q). In particular, q0i;i can be chosen such it is q for all i  n. Obviously q  1,
since it is a probability, and q  1
n
, because the DM can do no worse than her prior.
If K is strictly convex and continuously differentiable, then the first-order condition
(FOC) of this problem with respect to each q0i;i is:










Because of the strict convexity of K and the restriction on its derivative, the FOC, to-
gether with the constraints in (3.19), is both necessary and sufficient for a solution to this
problem. Therefore, anyQ0 such that (q0i;i)ni=1 satisfies (3.19) and the constraints in (3.19) is
optimal. In particular, we can select Q0 such that q0i;i = q 8 i  n, where q := (K 0) 1(r),
and q0i;j = 1 qn 1 8 j 6= i; i  n.








i = q = (K
0) 1(r), which is continuous
in r, since K is continuously differentiable.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. To proceed, we need a lemma:
Lemma 1. Let ,  , and  be strictly positive. Then (( + ))   () is strictly
decreasing in  for positive  and strictly increasing for in  for negative .
This lemma is easily proven by differentiating to obtain [(( + ))   ()].
Since the normal density is decreasing on the positive real line and increasing on the
negative real line, this derivative is negative for positive  and positive for negative .
For guesses of inner states that are not the true state, the result follows from setting
 = 2k + 1 and  = 2 for k 6=  1 and comparing it to the expression in Lemma 1 when
 = 2k+3. This shows that guessing an inner state that is not the true state is likelier than
guessing the inner state that is immediately farther from it. Applying this logic iteratively
and exploiting the symmetry of the normal distribution to compare guesses of inner states
on opposite sides of the true state gives the result.
In order to show that guessing the true state is likelier than guessing any other inner
state, assume that the true state is not n 1 or n, so that state immediately above the true
state is also an inner state. (An obvious symmetric argument applies in case the true state
is n 1 or n.) Lemma 1 implies that:
()  (0) > (2)  () and ()  (0) > (3)  (2)
=) 2[()  (0)] > (3)  ()
=) ()  ( ) > (3)  ()
Since the probability of guessing the true state is at least ()  ( ) (the true state
could be the lowest state), combining this implication with the result for inner states that
are not the true state proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 11





[2 () + (n  2) (2 ()  1)] K()
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[(2n  2) ()  (n  2)] K() (3.21)
The first-order condition is:
F (r; )  (2n  2)r
n
() K 0() = 0 (3.22)





() K 00() < 0; since  is positive




[(2n  2)((r))  (n  2)] (3.23)































































































































Substituting (3.25) and (3.26) back into (3.24) gives us that d2P 
dr2





< 0. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. The principal’s maximand is:
x  r





As argued in the main text of the paper, if this maximand is strictly quasiconcave in r,
then this problem has a unique solution for each x, and since it is continuous in both x and
r, the maximum theorem guarantees that the principal’s optimal payment strategy r(x)
is continuous. Therefore, it simply remains to be shown that the maximand is strictly




(n  1) exp    r

  1 






Since the denominator in (3.28) is always strictly positive, the sign of (3.28) depends only
on the sign of the numerator. The numerator is strictly positive (negative) when:



















The LHS of (3.29) is strictly decreasing, and diverges to positive infinity as r is taken to
negative infinity and to negative infinity as r is taken to positive infinity. The RHS of (3.29)
is strictly increasing, and it approaches zero as r is taken to negative infinity and diverges
to positive infinity as r is taken to positive infinity. Therefore, by the intermediate value
theorem, the LHS and RHS must intersect, and they do so only at a single r.










, after which it is strictly decreasing. Thus, (3.27) is strictly quasi-
concave.








[ P (r) + (x  r) d
dr
P (r)]
=   2 d
dr




(3.30) is negative, since P (r) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and x > r, so the
principal’s ex-ante expected payoff is strictly concave in r. Therefore, there is a unique r
for each x, and by the maximum theorem, r(x) is continuous.
Appendix B: Angle Task
In addition to the “dots” tasks discussed in the main body of the paper, laboratory subjects
also completed 100 “angle” tasks. For each of these tasks, subjects were shown a pair of
intersecting line segments of random length¹³ and orientation and were told to identify
the angle between them. This angle could have been 35, 40, 45, 50, or 55, with each
being equally likely. Subjects were rewarded for a correct answer and received no reward
for an incorrect answer. Therefore, the “angle” tasks were uniform guess tasks of the same
format as the “dots” tasks. Figure B.1 shows what this screen looks like to the subjects.
¹³Giving the arms of the angle random length ensured that subjects could not simply measure the dis-
tance between the endpoints of the arms to estimate the size of the angle.
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Table 1: Linear regression of correctness on incentive level and demographic covariates
in the “angle” tasks
(1) (2)




















Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Standard errors clustered on subject.
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Figure 1: Angle display for a task
Table B.1 presents linear regressions of correctness on incentive level and demo-
graphic covariates for the entire laboratory subject pool. As was the case with the “dots”
task, demographics are not significant predictors of correctness. However, neither is in-
centive level. This evidence indicates that this is not a task in which subjects generally
respond to incentives.
Appendix C: Online Rational Inattention Experiment
In this appendix, we describe and present results from the online experiments mentioned
in the main body of the paper.
Subjects were recruited using the AmazonMechanical Turk platform and participated
in the experiment on theQualtrics platform. A total of 118 subjects completed the exper-
iment. Subjects completed 200 tasks, each of the “dots” type. Roughly half the subjects
(57 subjects) were given a participation fee of $3 US and potential monetary prizes of $3,
while the other half (61 subjects) were given a participation fee of $5 US and potential
monetary prizes of $5 US.
C1: Demographics
Table C.1 lists basic demographic data for the online subjects. The pool is fairly gender-
balanced,¹⁴ though it is slightly more male than female, and highly educated; over 55% of
the pool has a post-secondary degree.
The online pool is signficantly different from the laboratory pool in some ways. In
particular, the online pool is significantly older (one-tailed t-test of unpaired samples,
¹⁴One online subject declined to disclose their gender.
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Table 2: Online Demographics
Number of subjects n = 118
Gender (n = 117) 52.5% male; 47.5% female
Age (n = 118) Average: 32.48; St. dev.: 8.88
Highest level of education achieved (n = 118)
Some post-secondary 43.2%
Completed bachelor’s degree 50.0%
Completed graduate or professional degree 6.8%
p < 0:001) and has a significantly greater proportion of subjects with bachelor’s degrees
but no advanced degrees (one-sided test of equality of proportions, p = 0:003).
C2: Rational Inattentiveness
No Improving Attention Cycles
We test against weak positive monotonicity using the method of (Doveh et al., 2002). At
the 5% level, we fail to reject positive monotonicity for 103 out of 118 online subjects
(87.3%).¹⁵
No Improving Action Switches
We test for NIAS using the bootstrap procedure outlined in Section 1.7. 82 out of 118
online subjects (69.5%) fail to reject NIAS.
Overall, this gives us 72 out of 118 online subjects (61.0%) whom we classify as ra-
tionally inattentive. This is a significantly smaller portion than in the laboratory pool
(one-sided test of proportions, p < 0:001).
C3: Responsiveness to Incentives
We test for responsiveness using the full-sample and split-sample tests outlined in Section
1.7. At the 5% significance level 28 out of 72 online subjects (38.8%) who fail to reject
rationality are responsive to incentives. This is a significantly smaller portion than in the
laboratory pool (one-sided test of proportions, p = 0:009).
C4: Model Selection
We follow the same model selection procedures as in Section 1.7. As with the labora-
tory subjects, the only models that best fit the subjects are binary response and logistic
response. 2 out of 28 responsive subjects (7.1%) are best fit by constant performance 8
¹⁵The optimization in the computation of the restricted regression for online subject 93 failed to con-
verge, and so we did not perform the test for them. That subject has a success rate in the tasks of 99% (i.e.
they identify the true state of nature correctly in 198 out of 200 tasks), and so we include them in the 103
online subjects who fail to reject positive monotonicity.
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out of 28 responsive subjects (28.6%) are best fit by binary performance, 17 out of 28 re-
sponsive subjects (60.7%) are best fit by logistic performance, and 1 out of 28 responsive
subjects (3.6%) are best fit by the concave performance function implied by normal sig-
nals. Ignoring the subjects who are best fit by constant response, these are similar to the
proportions found in the laboratory. This seems to indicate that once the subset of re-
sponsive subjects is identified, the incidence of different types of cost functions within it
is stable across contexts.
Appendix D: Instructions for Promises and
Pronouncements Experiment
Included below are the instructions read out to participants for the baseline treatment.
“Individual A” refers to the Sender role, and “Individual B” refers to the Receiver role.
Welcome to the Columbia Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences (CELSS)!
Your participation in this experiment is much appreciated. During this session, we require
your complete, undivided attention. As such, we ask that you remain quiet for the
duration of the session, refrain from opening other applications on your computer, refrain
from talking or passing notes to other participants, and put away all of your possessions,
including your cell phones, which must be turned off. Do not touch the computer terminals
until the session begins.
Before we begin, please read and sign both copies of the consent form located at your
terminal.
[COLLECT CONSENT FORMS AND ENSURE THAT THEY ARE ALL SIGNED AND
DATED]
You will be paid in cash for your participation in this experiment. Payment will occur
once the session is over. This payment will be based partially on your own decisions and
partially on the decisions of others; different participants may earn different amounts.
The entire session takes place at your computer terminals, including interaction with
other participants. During the session, you may not communicate with other subjects,
except through the computer terminals, as described later in the instructions.
The session will take place in four phases. The first phase will consist of a short quiz to
test your understanding of the instructions. Your answers on this quiz will not determine
your payment. The second phase is the actual experiment, which we will describe shortly.
The third phase consists of three short questions about the outcomes of the second
phase. Your responses in the second and third phases will determine your payment. The
fourth phase consists of a brief questionnaire. Your answers to this questionnaire will not
determine your payment. The first phase will begin once I have finished reading out the
instructions. If you have any questions while I am reading out the instructions, please
raise your hand, and your question will be answered out loud for the other participants
to hear. If you have questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and remain
silent; we will come to your terminal to assist you.
The second phase will consist of 2 rounds. At the start of each round, you will be
randomly matched with another participant. Each pair of participants will follow the same
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rules, and the actions of no pair will have any effect on any other pair. The matching is
anonymous; at no point during or after the experiment will you be told with whom you
were paired in any round. Each participant in a pair will be assigned one of two roles, A
or B. If you were assigned role A in one round, you will be assigned role B in the next,
and vice versa. You will not be informed of the outcomes of any round until after the
third phase.
Each round consists of two stages, scenario 1 and scenario 2. Scenario 1 may happen
before scenario 2, or scenario 2 may happen before scenario 1; both orders are equally
probable. Individual A will be told which scenario occurs first; individual B will not.
Between the two stages, you will be randomly rematched with another participant in the
role that is opposite yours.
Scenario 1 looks like this. [SHOW DIAGRAM OF ‘PROMISES’ GAME] First, Individ-
ual A chooses to go Left or to go Right. Then, without seeing which direction A chose,
Individual B also chooses to go Left or to go Right. If both individuals go in the same
direction, then they both earn 10 points. If they choose to go in different directions, then
A earns 15 points, and B earns 0 points. After selecting a direction but before B makes
their choice, A chooses a message to send to B. A has a choice between sending: “Going
Left is in your best interests” or “Going Right is in your best interests.”
To recap the order of actions: First, Individual A chooses Left or Right from a screen
that looks like this [SHOW SCREENSHOT OF A’S PROMISES ACTION SCREEN]. Then
A chooses a message to send to Individual B from a screen that looks like this [SHOW
SCREENSHOT OF A’S PROMISES MESSAGE SCREEN]. Finally, B receives the message
and chooses Left or Right from a screen that looks like this [SHOW SCREENSHOT OF
B’S PROMISES CHOICE].
Scenario 2 looks like this. [SHOW DIAGRAM OF ‘PRONOUNCEMENTS’ GAME] It
is exactly like Scenario 1, except that A’s choice of direction is instead randomly made by
the computer; the computer chooses Left or Right, each with 50% probability. Just as in
Scenario 1, before B makes their choice, A selects a message to send to them: “Going
Left is in your best interests”; or “Going Right is in your best interests.”
To recap the order of actions: First, the computer randomly selects Left or Right.
Then, A learns of the computer’s choice and selects a message to send to B from a screen
that looks like this. [SHOW SCREENSHOT OF A’S PRONOUNCEMENTS MESSAGE
SCREEN] Finally, B receives the message and chooses Left or Right from a screen that
looks like this [SHOW SCREENSHOT OF B’S PROMISES CHOICE].
After both rounds are over, we will move on to the third phase of the experiment,
where you will be asked three questions about the outcomes of the second phase. A correct
answer to one of these questions is worth 4 points. Following these three questions, we
will move on to the questionnaire phase. The questionnaire will have no impact on your
payment.
To reiterate: you will not be informed about the outcome or the decisions made by
the people with whom you were paired in any round until after the third phase. After the
third phase, one stage from each of the 2 rounds of Phase 2 and one of the first two of
the three questions of Phase 3 will be randomly selected by the computer, and you will
be paid your earnings for those stages and that question at a rate of 2 points to 1 dollar.
Additionally, you will be paid a show-up fee of 10 points, or 5 dollars. Earnings will be
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rounded up to the nearest dollar. Payment will occur in private, and you are under no
obligation to reveal to other participants how much you were paid.
We will now begin the quiz to test your understanding of the instructions. Please
answer the questions on your computer screen. When you are done, you will receive
immediate feedback about your performance.
[QUIZ]
Now that you have all completed the quiz, are there any questions? We will now begin
the actual experiment. From now on, if you have any questions, please remain silent and
raise your hand, and we will come to your terminal to assist you.
[EXPERIMENT AND QUESTIONNAIRE]
The session is now over. Please wait quietly while we deliver further instructions.
You will be paid in the adjacent room. We will call you one by one, in order of your
lab ID numbers, located on the side of your carrel. Please remain silent and seated until
we call your ID. When we call your number, please take all your belongings with you, as
you will be asked to leave the lab once you have received your payment.
Thank you very much for your participation.
[CALL OUT ID’S, GIVE PAYMENT]
Appendix E: Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 20
Proof. By (3.2) and (3.4), the problem of minimizing (3.5) is additively separable across
attributes. Therefore, I can consider each attribute value separately.
Consider attribute j of item i. The DM’s problem is to minimize:
E[(ai;j   a^i;j)2] + C(fi;j; gi;j) (3.31)
subject to R
r
gi;j(ri;j)dri;j = 1 8 a 2 R.
In what follows, we drop the subscripts i and j to save on notation. The Lagrangian




































where (a) = (a)=f(a) and (a) are Lagrange multipliers.¹⁶
I now apply the variational method (cf. MacCluer, 2013). Consider (r; a) smooth
such that limr! 1 (r; a) = limr!1 (r; a) = lima! 1 (r; a) = lima!1 (r; a) = 0.
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and (a) =  ln(p).
(3.36) gives the density of a normal distribution with mean h and variance 2 .
Since the DM wishes to minimize posterior variance, she selects h as her posterior,
provided 
2
< 2f , where 2f denotes the prior variance. Otherwise, she opts not to collect
information about this particular attribute and simply uses her prior.
Proof of Proposition 21
Proof. It is known that if ai;j is normally distributed and ri;j is normally distributed cen-
tred around ai;j , then the posterior belief of the value of ai;j upon observing ri;j is also
normally distributed. In what follows, we drop subscripts for convenience’s sake.
Suppose a  N(; 2f ) and r  N(a; 2g). Then, tedious calculations show that the
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Proof of Proposition 22
Proof. First, I must compute the relevant conditional densities. For the sake of conve-
nience, I drop subscripts and assume that the DM is trying to estimate the attribute values
x, y, and z, with the knowledge that x > y > z. Assume that without knowledge of the
ranking, x; y; z  N(; 2).
Let  and  denote the standard normal density and CDF, respectively. I begin by
computing the conditional density of x:
f(xjx > y > z)
=
f(x \ x > y > z)





 1 f(x; y; z)dz dy
1
6






































































Similarly, for the middle-ranked attribute value y:





























































And finally, for the lowest-ranked attribute value z:






































Now, to save on notation, I assume that  = 0 and compute the expectations of each
of these densities. I can do this because the variance of a normal distribution invariant to
translation, and ultimately the expectation is only needed to compute the variance.














































































; since the standard normal distribution is symmetric about 0 (3.42)




, and the conditional expecta-
tion of y is 0, since its distribution is symmetric and centred around 0.
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By symmetry, this is also the second moment of z. Therefore, the variances of x and z
are:





































































































































V (y) < V (x) = V (z), so by Corollary 1, this concludes the proof of the first part of the
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proposition. The second follows easily from the fact that if the attributes are identically
distributed, then V (x), V (y), and V (z) are constant across attributes.
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